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This study investigates three issues connected with governance and citizens
welfare in Nigeria. One of the current debates in the political economy literature
focuses on the benets of democracies to ordinary citizens, especially in develop-
ing countries, and particularly in sub-Saharan African countries. Most Nigerians
have been questioning the benets of transition from military rule to democratic
rule in 1999 to ordinary citizens. This concern relates to the lack of credibility of
electoral processes in the country. Politicians in Nigeria have embarked on various
unlawful strategies both to win and perpetuate positions of power, with no regard
for the principles of free and fair elections. Non-credible elections often lead to
capture of political power at both national and sub-national levels in the country
by special interest groups headed by political godfathers1. This thesis examines
whether transition from an autocratic military regime to a relatively competitive
democratic regime results in higher provision of public goods and a reduction in
health inequality, given the prevalence of political capture due to lack of credi-
ble electoral competition in Nigeria. The thesis questions the assumption that
transition from a military dictatorship to relatively competitive democratic rule
will ensure an increase in the provision of public goods and a reduction in health
inequality.
The thesis is divided into three sections, as follows: Chapter 2 considers the
e¤ects of political power competition on public expenditure on health, water, ed-
ucation and social services at the national level and households access to safe
1Political godfathersare the professional politicians in Nigeria. These politicians are old but
rich enough to sponsor candidates for an elective positions at various levels of governments during












drinking water at the state level in the country. The paper uses a Bounds testing
approach to co-integration and panel analysis to analyze the impacts of transi-
tion from military rule to democratic rule on public expenditure including health,
education, water services and infrastructure in Nigeria. The thesis shows that
political competition is signicant and positively related to an increase in public
expenditure on health, education and water in the country. However, our dynamic
panel analysis shows that access to safe drinking water did not improve in the rst
ten years of democratic rule across the 37 states in the country, though there was
an astronomical increase in public expenditure within the same period in these
states. We argued that gap between public expenditure on public goods and ac-
cess to public goods may be link to diversion of public funds to private pockets
due to the high rate of rent seeking in the country.
Chapter 3 looks at the consequences of provision of access to alternative sources
of water and sanitation on childhood malnutrition in the country. In this chap-
ter, anthropometric measures of child health are employed to analyze the e¤ect of
access to di¤erent sources of drinking water and sanitation in households on the
health status of children in the country. Our interest in this issue is to empirically
identify the health implications of a lack of safe drinking water on the most vul-
nerable portion of the countrys population. Survey regression analysis methods
are used to examine the e¤ect of access to di¤erent sources of water and sanita-
tion on height z-scores and weight z-scores of children aged 0-59 months in the
country. In addition, the chapter uses survey probit regression methods to analyze
the probability of a child being stunted and underweight as a result of access to
di¤erent sources of water and sanitation. The results specically show that drink-











drinking of piped water. The probability of being stunted and being underweight
is signicantly higher for children who drink well water. The chapter therefore
conrms that it is necessary for policy makers to prioritize the provision of safe
drinking water.
The thesis clearly distinguishes between health outcomes and health inputs
in chapter 3. The analysis reveals the implication of householdsaccess to safe
drinking water and sanitation on childrens health outcomes. It specically shows
that householdsaccess to piped and borehole water are both positively related
to childrens height for-age Z-scores. Importantly, we nd that access to borehole
water is signicant and negatively related to childrens weight z-scores and the
probability of children being underweight.
In line with our ndings, access to proper human waste disposal systems, es-
pecially ush toilets, is crucial for the healthy growth of children in the country.
Children in households with access to ush toilets are less prone to chronic mal-
nutrition (inadequate growth). Our study also shows that access to ush toilets
reduces the probability of a child becoming stunted. Where provision of ush
toilets is not immediately feasible, it is necessary to provide, for the short term,
pit latrines for households in the country. Government should also propose a pol-
icy that will make construction of toilet facilities in new buildings mandatory in
the country. Our study shows that drinking well water is harmful to the growth
and health of children in Nigeria and has increased the number of children being
stunted and underweight. This is a strong signal to the various tiers of government
to expedite e¤orts to provide safe drinking water to every household in the country.
Womens education is another area that clearly should be promoted and encour-











the health outcomes of children.
Finally, in chapter 4, the study decomposes health inequality during the polit-
ical transition between 1999 and 2008 in Nigeria. In this chapter, Oaxaca-blinder
decompositions as well as decomposition of concentration indices are used to deter-
mine whether inequality in childrens health outcomes existed under military rule
in the country and to determine the direction of changes in health inequalities ten
years into democratic rule in Nigeria. This micro analysis shows that, there was
an increase in health inequality subsequent to transition to democratic rule in the
country. Inequality in access to basic services such as drinking water, and access to
food, as well as maternal and paternal education levels signicantly contribute to
the severity of health inequality under democratic rule in the country. The thesis
therefore concludes that while transition from military to democratic rule in the
presence of weak electoral competition and interest group capture may encourage
an increase in public expenditure on health, education, water and social services,
this may not increase access to public goods nor reduce health inequality without
credible elections and a concerted e¤ort by the elected leaders to reduce existing
inequality in access to basic services.
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Famines kill millions of people in di¤erent countries in the world,
but they dont kill the rulers. . . if there are no elections, no opposition
parties, no scope for uncensored public criticism, then those in au-
thority dont have to su¤er the political consequences of their failure
to prevent famines. Democracy, on the other hand, would spread the
penalty of famines to the ruling groups and political leaders as well
[Sen1999, 180].
Many scholars claim that democracy tends to improve the material
well being of the poor. I argue that previous tests of this claim were
awed, particularly by sample bias. Once these aws are addressed,
there is no evidence that poor people have beneted from living under











1.0.1 Overview of the Thesis
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the general consensus is that competitive
democracy is the best form of government to improve the lot of the poor and
reduce inequalities. Between 1960 and 2003, more than 100 countries have adopted
democratic forms of government (See table 1.1). In a like manner, many developing
countries, both in Africa and beyond, have experienced transition from dictatorial
regimes to democratic rule. In sub-Saharan Africa alone 43 countries switched from
previously autocratic rule to democratically elected governments. However, it is
not rare to see democratic governments relapsing back into dictatorial regimes.
Between 1960 and 2003, 44 or 38.6 percent democratic governments across the
globe underwent this reversal (see table 1.2). 8 of the reversals were in Latin
America. Table 1.3. Shows that sub-Saharan Africa led the reversals with 23
(or 53 percent) out of the total 43 democratized governments in the sub-region
reverting back to dictatorships between 1960 and 2003.
Table 1.1: Democratization of countries by Region and Decade: 1960-2003
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total percentage
Central America 2 1 4 4 0 11 9.6
South America 2 2 7 1 1 13 11.4
Western Europe 0 3 0 0 0 3 2.6
Eastern Europe 0 0 0 2 2 20 17.5
N. Africa/M.East 0 1 1 1 1 3 2.6
Asia 4 5 3 8 0 21 18.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 14 6 1 18 4 43 37.7
Source: Centre for Global Development
One of the reasons advanced in the literature by the critics of democracy in
developing countries is the failure of these governments to meet the need of the











guarantee good governance in democratic regimes without corresponding economic
rights, especially in developing countries. The proponents of electoral competition
argue that the economic needs of the poor are better met under democratic rule
than under any other forms of government. The controversy still persists between
these conicting opinions on the relationship between political power competition
and the welfare of the poor in developing countries.
Table 1.2: Global Democratization Reversal and Sustenance: 1960-2003
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total percentage
Democratizations 22 18 16 50 8 114 100
Sustained 4 6 13 39 8 70 61
No reversal 2 3 8 34 7 54 47.3
Minor reversal 2 3 5 5 1 16 14
Total Reversal 18 12 3 11 0 44 38.6
Source: Centre for Global Development working paper
Nigeria in particular is a good example of a country oscillating between military
dictatorships and democratically elected governments. The question is whether
electoral competition actually advances the economic interest of the poor majority,
as advocated in the literature. One of the main reasons the military always advance
for their intervention in politics in the country is the failure of elected leaders to
provide for the basic services needed by the poor. Surprisingly, there is no empirical
evidence either for or against this claim at national and sub-national level in the
country.
To address this issue, one must understand how the welfare of citizens is af-
fected by the activities of the government in power. One of the major ways is via
the allocation of public expenditure for the provision of public goods, which are in
most cases beyond the ability of ordinary citizens to access. Studies on advanced











Table 1.3: Democratization Reversal and Sustenance by Region: 1960-2003
Latin Western Eastern Sub-saharan N.Africa/ Asia
America Europe Europe Africa M.East
Democratizations 24 3 20 43 3 21
Sustained 17 3 18 20 2 10
No reversal 10 3 16 15 1 9
Minor reversal 7 0 2 5 1 1
Total Reversal 8 0 2 23 1 11
% per region 33.3 0 10 53.5 33.3 52.4
Source: Centre for Global Development working paper
tion to democratic rule. Increase in welfare related public expenditure is seen as
evidence of an increase in elected leaderscommitment to the welfare of ordinary
citizens. We are not sure whether this argument can be generalized, particularly
in Nigeria, where elections are often non credible due to high rate of rigging and
falsication of election results.
Table 1.4: Years of Military and Democratic rules in Nigeria






Total number of y ars 29 22
Source: Authors calculation
Does change in political power necessarily encourage an increase in public ex-
penditure on health, education and water in the presence of weak electoral compe-
tition in Nigeria? If so, is there evidence of an increase in the provision of public
goods subsequent to change in political power in the country? This thesis unravels
these arguments from National (macro) and sub-national (micro) perspectives. At











penditure to health, education, water and other social services and political power
competition under military and democratically elected governments between 1960
and 2009 in Nigeria. At the State level, we used dynamic panel data to analyze
the relationship between changes in government and households access to safe
drinking water in the country. State governments in Nigeria are constitutionally
required to provide drinking water to the citizens in the country.
If political leaders are not accountable to the electorate, public expenditure can
easily be diverted into private pockets. Diversion of public expenditure to private
pockets will eventually create gaps between allocation of public expenditure and
householdsaccess to public goods in the country. There are basically two levels
of embezzlement of public funds. Embezzlement of public funds may occur at the
level of collection of public revenue. In this case, the available public revenue will
be lower than the actual public revenue. It will then result into availability of fewer
resources to be allocated by the political leaders for public goods. In the second
case, part of government revenue allocated to public goods can be misappropriated
in terms of partial diversion of allocated funds to private pockets or in the form of
provision of either lower quality or quantity (both lower quantity and lower quality
in some cases) of budgeted public goods to the citizens.
Water is an important basic resource. Though water is a gift of nature, some
water sources can be injurious to human health. For governments to really meet the
water needs of their citizens, they need to understand the e¤ect of various sources
of water on health outcomes in the country. In an attempt to satisfy water needs in
the country, the government at all levels has embarked on provision of well-water,
borehole or tap water without much consideration of how these sources of water











quality of well water in the country show that most of the well water contains
highly concentrated nitrate. High levels of nitrate intake are inimical (Adelana
and Olasehinde 2003; 2008) to good health. Therefore, the focus of this aspect of
our research is to use anthropometric measures, specically height for-age z-scores
and weight for-age z-scores to determine how these various sources of water a¤ect
the health of children in the country. We shall further employ a probit regression
method to analyze how access to these sources of water a¤ects a childs probability
of being stunted and being underweight. The thesis capitalizes on the measured
weight and heights of children available from the DHS of 2008 in Nigeria for the
analysis.
One of the objectives of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) is to reduce
every form of inequality in the world, including health inequality. Therefore, the
third issue the thesis addresses is whether childhood health inequality existed under
military rule in the country and whether health inequality persists subsequent to
transition to democratic rule in 1999. Due to a general increase in total public
expenditure as well as an increase in transfers under democratic rule, political
economy theories assume that inequality should be inversely related to democratic
rule. The argument is further re-enforced by the role of the electorate, who are
mostly poor, and their power to vote non-performing leaders out of o¢ ce. The
median voter theory, which is the main argument in this thinking, assumes that the
power of the electorate to vote in and out of power will compel leaders to provide
more public goods under democratic rule than under other forms of government.
Can we generalize this argument or is it conditional on elections being credible?
The general adage that "health is wealth" is instructive to our focus on health in











positively to economic development of the country, all things being equal. In
addition, good health also has a positive e¤ect on the learning attitude and abilities
of children and leads to better educational outcomes and increases the e¢ ciency
of human capital development by individuals, household and the nation (Strauss
and Thomas, 1998; Schultz, 1999). Illness reduces physical, mental and income
ability of the populace and their economic usefulness.
Therefore, the most important need of every citizen under either military or
democratic rule is health. However, children are the most vulnerable group in the
society. One of the most important functions of government is to protect the rights
of every child, especially health. When a childs health is guaranteed the future of
such a child and the country at large is protected. If citizens health, especially the
poor are not protected, all other activities of government in trying to provide for
the basic needs of the citizens will be unproductive. Since children cannot protect
themselves, their survival depends on both their parents and government in power
in the country. It is however assumed that democratic governments will be more
committed to policies aimed at improving citizens health and as well reduce health
inequality between the rich and the poor in the country.
1.0.2 Distinctions betweenMilitary and Democratic Regimes
in Nigeria and the general roles of government
Traditionally, the military role in Nigeria is to protect the country against in-
ternal and external aggression capable of undermining continual existence of the
country. The main distinction between military and democratic rule in Nigeria











by the electorates for a xed term of four years, successive military governments
in the country have assumed power via coups without the input of the general
public. Secondly, while democratic governments rule according to the provision
of the constitution, the military government always suspend the provisions of the
countrys constitution, including fundamental human rights. In addition, demo-
cratic governments in the country operate by the principle of separation of power
between the executives, legislature and the judiciary while the military head of
states have combined the duties of both the executive and the legislature under
successive military rule in the country. At the state level, the executive governors
are directly elected under democratic rule but under military rule, military gov-
ernors are single handedly appointed by the military head of states without the
input of the electorates.
The essence of governance under military and democratic rule is to provide for
the needs of the citizens. In recognition of the basic essence of governance, both
the military and the democratic governments in Nigeria are similar in terms of
their promise to provide basic infrastructures such as, qualitative and a¤ordable
education, a¤ordable public health care, safe drinking water and good road net-
work for the citizens. Therefore, di¤erences in the method of operations between
military rule and democratic rule in the country not withstanding, the primary
functions of every government is to provide for the collective welfare of the citizens











1.0.3 Brief History of Political Competition in Nigeria
Nigerias political history since independence in 1960 has been plagued with eth-
nic politics, greediness and bitter struggles to gain political power by politicians
with the sole aim of controlling government resources for themselves and their as-
sociates. Rather than aiming to serve the interests of citizens, politicians aim to
enrich themselves and their supporters on assumption of power. Therefore, most
of the elections are not credible as various political parties engaged in excessive
electoral malpractice and persecution of the opposition (including assassinations)
in their main political strongholds. Di¤erent tactics, including appeals to religion
and ethnicity are often employed to gain political support and blackmail political
opponents in the country. In 1960, there were three main political parties in the
country, namely: the Northern peoples Congress (NPC), the Action Group (AG)
and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). These three political
parties dominated political activities in the Northern region, Western region and
Eastern region respectively. In addition, these political partiesmembership was
predominantly Hausa (NPC), Yoruba (AG) and Ibo (NCNC) ethnic groups, which
are the main ethnic groups in the country. As observed by Falola and Matthew
(2008), the fear of domination of the country by rival ethnic groups was the main
concern at independence.
Within the regions, the fear of domination also pervaded the various ethnic
groups, so political power was seen as the main source of acquiring power to
enrich both selves and associates. Between 1960 and 1965, there were several
crises, both within and between the regions, related to politicians with the sole











In the midst of these political crises in the country, the rst military coup took
place in the early hours of January 15, 1965. The coup plotters claimed they were
motivated by the level of corruption and ethnic politics in the country. The politics
of grabbing national resources and bitter rivalry under democratic rule, however,
persisted under military leadership. Rivalry among the military o¢ cers resulted
in a civil war that claimed nearly 3 million lives between 1967 and 1970. The
discovery of oil gave much hope of better life to citizens. However, the expansion
of the petroleum industry did not benet ordinary citizens much, contrary to all
expectations, as the wealth beneted mainly people with access to political power.
The military remained in power between 1966 and 1979 after several coups and
counter coups by military o¢ cers. In 1979, ve political parties, the Unity Party of
Nigeria (UPN), National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP),
Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) and Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) were
registered and cleared to contest the general elections. Ironically, most of the
parties were dominated by the old politicians responsible for the collapse of the
rst republic.
The economy of the country had nearly collapsed by the end of 1983 due to the
high rate of corruption and total neglect of public services and excessive rigging
during elections. There was a general cry in the country for the return of the
military to take over governance from the politicians. The cry was heeded by
the military when they took over the government and sacked all the politicians
in December 31st 1983. There was jubilation in every part of the country, except
among the politicians who had nearly milked the citizens to death. A popular Fuji











"Ebawa dupe lowo ologun o to gbawa lowo oselu o, gbogbo Nigeria
lapapo adupe o".
This translates into: "help us show appreciation and gratitude to the Military
on behalf of all Nigerians for delivering us all from the politicians". Politicians
completely lost credibility and they did not taste power again until 1999 when the
military again relinquished power due to pressure from the international commu-
nity and public outcry against the brutal regime of former military dictator, the
late General Sani Abacha.
In 1999, politicians returned to power after many years of military dictatorship.
It seems however that Nigerian politicians are yet to learn their lessons from their
predecessors. Elections in the country have been far from free and fair since then.
Joint report of the various transitional monitoring groups during 2007 general
elections titled "An Election Programmed to Fail" clearly buttress the general
perception of massive electoral malpractices in the country as follows:
"Our monitors throughout the country noted and documented nu-
merous lapses, massive irregularities and electoral malpractices that
characterized the elections in many states. Based on the widespread
and far-reachi g nature of these lapses, irregularities and electoral mal-
practices, we have come to the conclusion that on the whole, the elec-
tion was a charade and did not meet the minimum standards required
for democratic elections. We therefore reject it and call for its cancella-
tion. The Federal Government and the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC) have failed woefully in its responsibility to con-











Electoral malpractices in the country are manifest since 1960 but are now at
higher magnitudes since 1999. Some of these lapses known to the authority include
the following:
Intimidation of voters and independent election observers
Partisanship of electoral o¢ cers and security agents
 High incidence of violence and assassinations during elections
 High rate of underage voting
 Hoarding of election materials, including ballot papers and result sheets by
electoral o¢ cials
Stu¢ ng of ballot papers by dominant parties, often with the connivance of
electoral o¢ cers and security o¢ cials
 Snatching and theft of ballot boxes and papers
Total absence of voting in many polling stations across the federation, espe-
cially in the South East and the North East, and yet results were produced for
those states.
Returning of votes exceeding the total number of registered voters in many
polling stations
Diversion of election materials, especially ballot papers and result sheets, to
private homes of powerful politicians from where the ballot papers were thumb
printed or the results of elections were written and
 Deliberate refusal to provide adequate voting materials to polling stations
(Olukoshi, 2000; TMG, 1999, 2003 and 2007).
Since the inception of the present democratic rule, there has been widespread
political assassinations and ruthless suppression of opposition in every part of the











John 2004; Onwuka K 2005 and O¢ ong and Igbafe 2007)1. Corruption has been
at its highest level in all tiers of government. There is decay of the countrys
infrastructure in both rural and urban areas due to lack of maintenance, and
failure by the government to provide new infrastructure. Nigeria beneted greatly
from the astronomical increase in the international price of crude oil between 1999
and 2008. The rate of growth of real GDP also rose from 2.9 percent in 2000 to
about 6 percent in 2007. However, whether ordinary citizensstandard of living is
better in the country under democratic rule is di¢ cult to judge, and is the focus
of this thesis.
1.0.4 Objectives of the thesis
The objectives of the thesis are:
 To analyze the e¤ects of transition from military dictatorships to demo-
cratically elected governments in Nigeria on the allocation of public expenditure
on health, education, water and social services2.
 To use anthropometric measures to evaluate how sources of drinking wa-
ter and access to sanitation a¤ect childrens health outcomes in Nigeria.
 To analyse health inequality under military rule in Nigeria and during
political transition in the country.
1See Edemodu A (2002); Ivbaze Osazua (2006); Moghalu G (2003); Nwokocha John
(2004);Onwuka K (2005) and O¢ ong and Igbafe (2007) for detailed accounts of political as-
sassination in Nigeria.
2Public expenditure on education, water and social services are jointly analyzed and refers
to as welfare related public expenditure in chapter 2 due to the limitation of lack of a reliable











1.0.5 Research Questions of the thesis
The following are the research questions of the thesis:
 Does transition from military rule to democratic rule necessarily increase
public expenditure on health, education, water and social services in Nigeria?
 Did household access to safe drinking water improve in the rst ten years
of democratic rule in Nigeria?
 What is the impact of the varying quality of public goods provision,
specically varying sources of drinking water, on childrens health in Nigeria?
 Has health inequality been reduced subsequent to transition frommilitary
rule to democratic rule in Nigeria?
1.0.6 Organization of the thesis
In this chapter, the main topics covered in this thesis have been outlined. These
include the introduction, objectives, hypothesis and the research questions of the
thesis. The research issues shall be divided into three main essays with each of
them constituting a separate chapter.
In chapter 2, the thesis examines the e¤ect of electoral competition at the
national level on the allocation of public expenditure on health, education, water
and social services in Nigeria. It further considers whether access to safe drinking
water increased at the state level in the country between 1999 and 2008.
Chapter 3 focuses on the implications of drinking of water from di¤erent sources
and di¤erent sanitation options on the growth of children at the households level in
Nigeria. The chapter specically shows that drinking of well water retards growth











and hygienic sanitation at the households level by the government should be given
priority.
Chapter 4 explores the direction of change in health inequality subsequent to
transition to democratic rule in 1999 at the households level. It uses concentration
indices and Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to show that health inequality rose,
to the disadvantage of children in poor households, subsequent to transition to
democratic rule in the country.
The thesis clearly distinguishes between health outcomes and health inputs in
chapter 3 and 4. The analysis reveals the implication of householdsaccess to safe
drinking water and sanitation on childrens health outcomes. It specically shows
that householdsaccess to piped and borehole water are both positively related
to childrens height for-age Z-scores. Importantly, we nd that access to borehole
water is signicant and negatively related to childrens weight z-scores and the
probability of children being underweight.
In line with our ndings, access to proper human waste disposal systems, es-
pecially ush toilets, is crucial for the healthy growth of children in the country.
Children in households with access to ush toilets are less prone to chronic mal-
nutrition (inadequate growth). Our study also shows that access to ush toilets
reduces the probability of a child becoming stunted. Where provision of ush
toilets is not immediately feasible, it is necessary to provide, for the short term,
pit latrines for households in the country. Government should also propose a pol-
icy that will make construction of toilet facilities in new buildings mandatory in
the country. Our study shows that drinking well water is harmful to the growth
and health of children in Nigeria and has increased the number of children being











to expedite e¤orts to provide safe drinking water to every household in the country.
Womens education is another area that clearly should be promoted and encour-
aged by the government because of the positive impact of motherseducation on
the health outcomes of children.
Lastly, chapter 5, which is the nal chapter, draws conclusions from our nd-
ings, presents policy implications and recommends areas of future research arising












Democracy and provision of
public goods in Nigeria: A
Bounds Testing and Panel
Approach
Abstract
In this paper we examine the e¤ects of transition from military rule to demo-
cratic rule on health, education, water and public expenditure on social services
at the national level (public expenditure on water, education and social services
are jointly referred to as welfare related public expenditure in this study) and ac-
cess to safe drinking water at the state levels in Nigeria. We use a bound testing
approach to cointegration to establish a long run relationship between political











related public expenditure on the other hand in the country. Our results show that
political power competitions have a positive and signicant relationship to health
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure between 1960 and 2007. Our
results also indicate that per capita health expenditure was signicantly higher
under democratic rule in the country compared to the period under military rule.
However, there was no signicant relationship between political power competition
and public expenditure on infrastructure (Capital expenditure), from our ndings.
This result conrmed previous studies conclusions that politicians prefer to invest
in relatively visible and targeted public goods with the purpose of boosting their
re-election chances rather than relatively non-targeted and long term capital goods
(Vergne, 2009)1
For the panel analysis, we use the GMM estimator, as modied by Arrellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), to establish the relationship
between electoral competitions and provision of safe drinking water across states
in the country. Our results show that democracy at the sub-national levels has
not improved provision of safe drinking water in the country, despite an increase
in government expenditure subsequent to democratic transition in 1999. This, we
argue, is due to the problem of political capture by special interest groups at the
sub-national level, due to the lack of a credible electoral system in the country.
We therefore conclude that an increase in government expenditure subsequent to
transition of political power frommilitary rule to democratic rule may not translate
to an increase in access to basic services in the presence of interest groups capture
and weak electoral competition.
1Vergne, (2009) discussed in details, various theories on targeted investment expenditure and
manipulation of current expenditure by political o¢ ce holders with the sole objective of wining











In a democracy the poor will have more power than the rich, be-
cause there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme-
Aristotle
People must organize for collective action to inuence the circum-
stances and decisions a¤ecting their lives. To advance their interests,
their voices must be heard in the corridors of power ... Ending human
poverty requires a democratic space in which people can articulate de-
mands, act collectively and ght for a more equitable distribution of
power ... Government that acts in the interest of poor people is easier
to achieve in democratic political systems where the poor represent a
signicant electoral bloc. (UNDP, 1997, pp. 94, 103, 105)
2.0.7 Introduction
The e¤ect of democracy (represented by electoral competition in this chapter) on
the provision of pro-poor basic services is still an open question, especially in young
democracies. There is no agreement yet on whether transitions from dictatorial
regimes to democratic regimes actually improve the welfare of citizens, especially in
Nigeria. Some scholars have attempted to address this issue at cross-national level,
in developed countries in particular(Ross, 2006;Keefer, 2004; Avelino, Brown, and
Hunter, 2005; Brown and Hunter, 2004; McGuire, 2006). Most of these studies
focus on the e¤ects of democracy on allocations of public expenditure to pro-
poor public goods. The general belief is that when budgetary allocation to public
utilities such as drinking water, sanitation and electricity increases, access to these











Brown and Hunter, 2004; McGuire, 2006).
The above thinking (assumption) may be appropriate in a transparent society
with credible electoral systems. However, in a society where a credible electoral
system is lacking, coupled with rent seeking, the connection between democratic
rule and an increase in public expenditure and access to public goods becomes less
apparent. Therefore, transition from a less inclusive military government to a more
inclusive democratic government may not necessarily improve provision of public
goods (Keefer, 2004; Ross, 2006; Habyarimana, et al.. 2007). It is imperative to
understand the e¤ects of political power competition on the provision of public
goods, especially at the national and sub-national levels. Theory suggests that
national and sub-national governments in developing countries are prone to the
problem of rent seeking and interest-groups capture (political capture), especially
when elections are not credible. Recent empirical studies also suggest that young
democracies characterized by weak electoral competition and social polarization
are prone to reduction in the provision of basic public goods (Keefer, 2004; Ross,
2006; Habyarimana, et al.. 2007)2.
Therefore, we examine the e¤ect of democratic rule in Nigeria on the alloca-
tion of public expenditure to public goods specically health and welfare related
public services (combination of public expenditure on education, water and social
services) at the national level and access to safe drinking water (pipe and bore-
hole water) at the states level in the country. We depart from previous studies by
combining time series analysis of public goods provision with an examination of
householdsaccess to drinking water as our measure of provision of public goods,
2See Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) for a detailed theoretical analysis of the e¤ects of











instead of just cross-national analysis which may not be able to account for het-
erogeneity in the practice of democracies across countries.
The novelty of this paper lies in three contributions: In the rst place, the
Bound Testing Approach we used is an improvement over other methods pre-
viously discussed in the literature to establish a long run relationship between
electoral competition and allocation of public goods. Secondly, as far as we know,
this is the rst attempt to use actual household access to public goods as a measure
of provision of public goods in studying the relationship between electoral compe-
tition and public goods provision at sub-national levels in Nigeria. We chose this
method to overcome the problem of leakages between allocation of public funds
and actual delivery of basic services, created by rent seeking at sub-national levels
in most of the states in the country.3 . This study is an answer to the recent call
by the World Bank to depart from the use of public expenditure as measure of
service delivery to citizens (World Bank, 2008).
Lastly, this is the rst case study, as far as we know that compares service
delivery under military rule with delivery under democratic rule in sub-Saharan
Africa in general and particularly in Nigeria. Filling this gap is important consid-
ering the common occurrence of military interventions in politics in the country
due to the perceived failure of the democratic governments to meet the aspira-
tions of the poor majority.We therefore focus on health related public service due
to the general adage that "health is wealth". Healthier citizens are likely going
to be more productive and contribute positively to economic development of the
3For instance, in one of the states in Nigeria, a former Local Government Chairman and the
Treasurer converted the sum of N6 million into their personal pockets out of the N7 million
mobilisation fees for the construction of a borehole. The contractor was only paid N1 million to











country, all things being equal (Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Schultz, 1999). Illness
reduces physical, mental and income ability of the populace and their economic
usefulness.
2.0.8 Nigerian political structure
Nigeria occupies an important place as the most populous young democratic coun-
try in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is also the second-largest economy on the continent,
after South Africa. Most of the problems common to developing countries experi-
menting with democracies are not strange to this country. Nigeria gained indepen-
dence from British rule in 1960. The rst democratic regime in the country lasted
for only ve years before it was truncated by the military in 1965. The country did
not experience democratic rule again until 1979, when another general election was
conducted. Once again, the military terminated the democratic government after
four years, in 1983, and remained in power until 1999. Since 1999, four general
elections have been conducted for the rst time at both the state and the federal
level. One major reason for military intervention in politics is the perceived failure
of the democratically elected leaders to provide basic services for its citizens.
Nigerias political structure consists of a federal government, 37 states, includ-
ing the federal capital territory, and 774 local governments. The states are con-
stitutionally independent of the federal government, politically, administratively
and nancially. These states were previously governed by military governors ap-
pointed by the military heads of state without the input of the electorate. Since
1999, governors have been elected directly by the voters for a term of four years.











term of four years. The president, governors and members of the legislative house
can all seek re-election after their rst term in o¢ ce (Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria: 1999).
Literature Review
Allocation of public expenditure to public goods and access to basic services such
as health care, clean drinking water and electricity a¤ects citizenshealth, poverty
reduction, growth, and environmental protection. Provision of these basic ser-
vices is beyond the ability of the poor due to the relatively high cost and their
non-excludability in consumption. However, these basic services are not readily
available in developing countries, partly due to bad governance. Democracy is
therefore in theory a remedy for the problem of bad governance, since elected
leaders under democratic rule should be more responsible and accountable to their
electorates than non-elected leaders under military rule. Autocratic governments
typically under-provide public goods, since they are neither accountable to the
electorates nor subject to electoral competition. Some critics argue that auto-
cratic governments are mainly engrossed in rent seeking and provision of targeted
public goods needed by special interest groups in order to remain in power (Meltzer
and Richard, 1981; Holbrook and Dunk, 1993; McGuire and Olson, 1996).
Less competitive governments such as those under military rule or one- party
governments share similarities with monopoly market situations. The welfare of
consumers is severely undermined by excessive prices and the rent extraction prac-
tices of monopolists, and the welfare of citizens is less a concern for non-elected
governments. Democratic rule, on the other hand encourages political competi-











1995: 393; Ashworth, Geys, Heyndels and Wille, 2006).
In addition, the pro-democratic literature further argues that electoral compe-
tition a¤ords the electorate the means of holding politicians accountable for their
actions. Therefore, the intensity of political competition among politicians and
political parties a¤ects the decisions of the incumbent politicians (and parties)
with regard to the provision of public goods. The presence of stringent political
competition provides a credible threat of removal from o¢ ce to the incumbent
(Zeckhauser et al, 2002; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003; Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003; Ghorbarah, Huth, and Russet 2004; Deacon, 2003; Meltzer
and Richard, 1981; McGuire and Olso, 1996; Shen, 2007). The number of countries
undertaking competitive elections increased from 60 to 100 between 1990 and 2000
(Keefer and Khemani, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003; Bueno de
Mesquita et al, 2003; Ghorbarah, Huth, and Russet 2004; Deacon, 2003; Meltzer
and Richard, 1981; McGuire and Olso, 1996; Shen, 2007)). Evidence from some
studies also conrms an increase in public expenditure with shifts from autocratic
regimes to democratic rule (Avelino, Brown, and Hunter 2005; Brown, and Hunter,
2004; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; McGuire, 2006).
Some scholars have, however, raised doubts over whether there is a positive
relationship between electoral competition and provision of public goods in both
developing countries and young democracies, since these countries are character-
ized by non-credible electoral systems, ethnic polarization, low literacy rates, cor-
ruption, limited rule of law and special interest politics. The argument is that
politicians in young democracies are less credible, under-provide public goods and
engage in excessive rent seeking (Keefer and Khemani, 2004; Keefer, 2005 and











studies is that the e¤ects of democracy on the provision of pro-poor public goods
cannot be generalized because of variations in its practices.
2.0.9 Empirical Model Specication and methods of analy-
sis
We use time series analysis to estimate the relationship between political power
competitiveness and public expenditure at the national level and we make use of
state panel data to estimate how electoral competition in the 37 states in Nigeria
a¤ects the provision of drinking water in these states. Our analysis of access to
drinking water at the state level is appropriate due to the fact that provision
of drinking water is one of the major responsibility of the state governments in
Nigeria.
Time series model and method
Based on the theory above on the provision of public goods and the standard
model of public expenditure, we propose the following time series relationship:
Exp = f(polity2; rpop; Linaid; Linpgdp; Under14) (5)
Where, Exp is the proportion of di¤erent public expenditure of interest as a
percentage of total public expenditure or GDP. polity2 is our measure of political
power competitiveness. polity24 was developed by the Polity 1V project for 164
countries as a measure of political power competitiveness of each country between
1800 and 2010. The datasets include eight factors ranging from the degree of
4Polity2 has been used by many authors in the past as an objective measure of political power
competitiveness.Some of the authors that used polity2 are Jaggers et al (1996); Gurr (1989); Gurr











political power competitiveness to the degree of constraint on the chief executive.
These factors are used to derive two weighted summary indicators of autocracy
and democracy. The two indicators are then combined to form a single measure
(polity2) of political power competitiveness. In the case of Nigeria, political power
competitiveness runs from a maximum of 8 to a minimum of -7. rpop is our
control for the rural population density to account for the possible bias in rural-
urban provision of public goods. Linaid; is the log of foreign aid which is expected
to have a positive e¤ects on public expenditure. Linpgdp;is the log of per capita
GDP to account for the e¤ects of the countrys economic development on the
provision of public goods. Under14 is the ratio of total population under the age
of 14years. This is the dependency ratio of the population and it is expected to
have a negative e¤ect on the availability of funds for public expenditure.
Linear representation of the model takes the following form:
Exp = a0 + a1polity2 + a2rpop+ a3Linaid+ a4Linpgdp+ a5Under14 (6)
The method used for the analysis of equation (6) is the Auto-Regressive Dis-
tributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach developed by Pesaran, et al, (2001).
This method has the following advantages over other methods, including Jo-
hansens cointegration technique: In the rst place, it yields consistent estimates
of the long run coe¢ cients irrespective of whether the regressors of our equation
are integrated of order zero I(0), order one I(1), or a mixture of both. Secondly,
the ARDL model is suitable for limited sample data of between 30 and 80 obser-
vations, as in our case (Narayan, 2004). In addition, it provides a remedy for the
problem of endogeneity bias by the inclusion of the variablesdynamics among
the regressors, as shown by Harris (2003). The rst step in the Bounds testing























a6Expt 1 + t (7)
where a0 is a drift component,  is change, while t represents a well behaved
error term. Other variables are as dened in equation (5). We used the ordinary
least square (OLS) method to estimate equation (7). The second step is the use
of a F-test of the estimated equation (7) for testing the null hypothesis of no
contegration; H0 : a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = a5 = a6 = 0 against the alternative
hypothesis of cointegration; H1:6= a1 6= a2 6= a3 6= a4 6= a5 6= a6 6= 0. There are
two asymptotic critical values generally referred to as lower and upper bounds.
While the lower bound assumes that all the regressors are I(0), the upper bound
assumes they are I(1). If the computed F-statistics lies below the lower bound,
it indicates no cointegration, meaning we must accept the null hypothesis. If
the computed F-statistics lies above the upper level of the bound, then we reject
the null hypothesis of no cointergration but accept the alternative hypothesis of
cointegration. Our inference will be inconclusive if the computed F-statistics lies
between the lower and upper bounds.
The next step in our analysis is to derive the long run and short run estimates
of our model using either Schartz Bayesian or Akaike information criteria based











Panel model and method
For our states panel analysis, we propose the relationship between provision of safe
drinking water and democracy to be:
Wi;t = a+ 1Exi;t + 2Lgi;t + 3Controli;t + Ui + i;t (8)
where Wi;t is the provision of safe drinking water in state i at time t, Exi;t
represents executive competitions in state i at time t, Lgi;t is the legislative com-
petition in state i at time t, while Controli;t are the control variables (average rain
fall, per capita gdp, population density, rural proportion of the state population
and opposition (which is a dummy indicating that the party ruling in the state is
di¤erent from the party ruling at the national level)) in state i at time t, Ui are
unobserved state specic e¤ects, while i;t is a random disturbance in state i at
time t. A dynamic representation of equation (8) is more appropriate considering
the fact that provision of safe drinking water in time t will be a¤ected by access
to water in time t 1:Therefore, the dynamic specication of the model is given as
Wi;t = Wi;t 1 + 1Exi;t + 2Lgi;t + 3Controli;t + Ui + i;t (9)
Here the OLS method will not be appropriate to estimate the above model
due to the correlation of Wi;t 1 with Ui which will lead to the OLS estimator
of the above model being biased and inconsistent. Random e¤ects regression is
also not appropriate due to a states specic unobservable characteristics which
may be correlated with the error terms. The next alternative is to consider xed
e¤ects regression, which enables us to control for omitted time-invariant state
characteristics. However, since our model includes a lagged dependent variable,
the use of xed e¤ects estimators introduces a potential bias. In addition, the











Method-of Moment (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bonds (1991)
as modied by Arrellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), and as
used by Vergne (2009) is the main solution to the issue of bias and inconsistency
in connection with our model. We therefore used a systematic GMM method
which enables us to control for unobservable state-specic-e¤ects and the possible
endogeneity of the explanatory variables. We in addition used the two step GMM
estimator which is asymptotically more e¢ cient than the one step GMM.
2.0.10 Measurements of other variables and sources of data
We source data for our time series analysis from the World Development Indicators
and the Statistical Bulletin of the Central Bank of Nigeria. In our panel analysis,
we are interested in the provision of basic services that promote sustainable de-
velopment of natural resources, but also provide the opportunity for sustainable
livelihoods through provision of clean drinking water within households. Lack of
this basic service will a¤ect the environment negatively, make life more di¢ cult for
the poor, and pose a danger to citizenshealth in general. We measure the states
mean access to safe drinking water (piped water within and outside the dwelling
as well as borehole water), as our proxy for the provision of public goods. We
source this variable from the National Bureau of Statistics Core Welfare Indica-
tors (CWI) survey of 2006 (NBS, 2008) and the National Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) datasets on Nigeria for 1990, 1999, 2003 and 2008. Therefore, the
values of variables used for our state panel analysis represent various states n-years
averages.











panel analysis at the sub-national levels by using one of the most objective mea-
sures available. This method takes into cognizance the degree of electoral compe-
tition at the state level. We calculate the data by using the standard indices from
the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) as proposed by Beck, Carke, Gro¤,
Keefer and Walsh (2001) in their paper, "New tools and new tests in comparative
political economy".
Table 2.1: Measurement of Executive competitions
EXECUTIVE CRITERIA SCORE
No executive in the state 1
Unelected executive 2
Elected but one candidate or one party 3
Multiple parties but winner got over 75% votes 4
Multiple parties but winner got between 65.1-75% votes 5
Multiple parties but 1 party got between 55.1-65% votes 6
Multiple parties but winner got less than 55% votes 7
LEGISLATIVE CRITERIA SCORE
No legislature in the state 1
Unelected legislature 2
Elected but one candidate 3
1 Party, multiple candidates 4
Multiple parties but only one party won seats 5
Multiple parties won seats but 1 party got more than 75% of seats 6
Largest party got less than 75% 7
The indices range from a minimum of 1 for the most autocratic system to
a maximum scale of 7 for the most inclusive competitive political system with
many parties, where the largest party receives less than 75 percent of the seats.
We collect election results from the National Bureau of Statistics in Nigeria and
the Independent National Electoral Commission in Nigeria. The results include











eral elections in each state. Since public goods provision may not immediately
be a¤ected by inclusiveness, that is, within the election year, we measure elec-
toral competition based on the political regimes in the year preceding the year of
observation.
The summary of the indices of electoral competitiveness, according to the scale
created by Ferree and Singh (1999), as modied by Keefer (2009) are as presented
in Table 2.1 for legislative and executive competition respectively.
Stylized Facts By Political Regime in Nigeria
The traditional role of the military in Nigeria is to protect the country teritory
against internal and external aggression capable of undermining continual exis-
tence of the country. The main distinction between military and democratic rule
in Nigeria are summarized below. In the rst place, while democratic leaders are
elected by the electorates for a xed term of four years, successive military gov-
ernments in the country have assumed power via coups without the input of the
general public. Secondly, while democratic governments rule according to the pro-
vision of the constitution, the military government always suspend the provisions
of the countrys constitution, including fundamental human rights. In addition,
democratic governments in the country operate by the principle of separation of
power between the executives, legislature and the judiciary while the military head
of states have combined the duties of both the executive and the legislature under
successive military rule in the country. At the state level, the executive governors
are directly elected under democratic rule but under military rule, military gov-
ernors are single handedly appointed by the military head of states without the












Summary statistics of our time series variables are presented in table 2.1. We
however focus our discussion of the descriptive analysis on the mean public expen-
diture on health and mean public expenditure on education as percentage of total
expenditure as seen in gure 2.1 and in table 2.2.
In Figure 2.1, we illustrate the relationship between democracy in Nigeria and
mean public health expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure between 1960
and 2008. The graph shows that mean public expenditure on health was generally
higher in the country under democratic rule than under military rule. While mean
health expenditure was 1.9 billions under democratic rule, it was only 0.9 billion
naira under military rule. In addition, while mean public expenditure on education
as a percentage of total public expenditure was 4.2 billions naira under democratic
rule, it was about 2.6 billions naira under the military rule in the country. It is
clearly evidence that democratic regimes on average spend more on health and
education in the country.
The illustration of the relationship between democracy and mean public ex-
penditure on education and health as percent of total expenditure in Figure 2.1
was further tested in table 2.3 using two sample t test to determine whether mean
public expenditure on health and education as percentage of total public expendi-
ture under the two regimes are statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero. Our
results show that public expenditure on public health as percentage of total ex-
penditure was signicantly lower under military rule compare to under democratic
rule in the country ( -4.2771; p =  0:0001). the alternative hyphothesis Ha, shows











Figure 2.1: Mean public expenditure on health and education as a percentage of











Table 2.2: Summary statistics of variables used for the analysis
V ariables observations mean std:Dev min max
healthexp 49 1.3018 0.9081 0.09344 3.9897
healthgdp 49 0.0002 0.00001 0 0.00013
under14 49 44.166 1.025 42.5733 45.8741
rgdp 50 204888 205670 2489 716949
aidk 49 7.4141 14.2690 0.9584 89.5142
healthk 49 0.0001 0.0002 6.06e-9 0.0006
pgdp 49 360.805 58.114 236.39 487.26
polity2 49 -1.1224 6.1054 -7 8
aid 49 7.74e+08 2.07e+09 6.93e+07 1.29e+10
rpopdensity 47 189.525 33.659 136.30 243.70
socioecons 49 56688 115328 5.70436 485000
socgdp 48 0.00008 0.00012 4.47e-08 0.00065
lpgdp 49 5.8753 0.1649 5.4655 6.1888
capgdp 49 156000 288901 63.874 1325019
eduexp 49 3.2394 1.9190 0.3139 8.2670
0.01%. In the case of mean public expenditure on education as percentage of total
public expenditure, the t statistics indicates that the two means are statistically
signicantly di¤erent from each other (t= -3.1553; p =  0:0028).
These ndings conrm our earlier assumption that public expenditure would be
higher under democratic rule than under military rule, irrespective of the problem
of electoral malpractice and interest groups capture.
2.0.12 Empirical Results and Analysis of the Bounds Test-
ing Approach
The ARDL method does not require testing for the order of integration of each
variable, but we conducted the test to be sure that our variables are not integrated












Table 2.3: Two-sample t test of mean public health and mean public education
expenditure in Nigeria
Public Health expenditure Public Education expenditure
Group obs mean std.Err std. Dev. Group obs mean std.Err std. Dev.
Military 29 0.9067 0.0855 0.4602 Military 29 2.580 0.3104 1.6713
Democracy 20 1.8746 0.2437 1.0897 Democracy 20 4.1956 0.4219 1.887
Combined 49 1.3018 0.1297 0.9081 Combined 49 3.2394 0.2741 1.919
*di¤= (M)- (D) -0.9679 0.2263 *di¤= (M)- (D) -1.6156 0.5120
t=-4.2771 t=-3.1553
Ho:di¤=0 Ho:di¤=0
Ha: di¤!=0 Pr( jTj > j t j ) = 0.0001 Ha: di¤!=0 Pr( jTj > j t j ) = 0.0028
*where M and D represents mean of public expenditure
under military and under democratic rule respectively
Table 2.4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Dickey-Fuller GLS (DFGLS) Unit
Root Tests
levels first difference Decision
V ariables ADF DFGLS ADF DFGLS ADF DFGLS
healthexp -1.358 -1.848 -5.891 -5.474 I(1) I(1)
healthgdp -0.890 -1.496 -5.648 -4.314 I(1) I(1)
under14 -4.167 -5.533 I(0) I(0)
rgdp 2.110 -0.572 -4.040 -4.500 I(1) I(1)
aidk -4.253 -4.027 I(0) I(0)
healthk 3.437 0.007 -4.891 -5.199 I(1) I(1)
pgdp -1.645 -1.363 -4.365 -4.432 I(1) I(1)
polity2 -2.618* -2.162 -3.968 I(0) I(1)
aid -4.112 -4.140 I(0) I(0)
rpopdensity -1.575 -0.934 -4.309 -4.295 I(1) I(1)
socioecons 3.710 -0.430 -3.260 -3.939 I(1) I(1)
socgdp 3.193 0.138 -3.367 -2.876 I(1) I(1)
lpgdp -2.149 -1.513 -4.760 -4.840 I(1) I(1)
capgdp 0.500 -1.271 -9.126 -4.129 I(1) I(1)
eduexp -3.594 -3.770 I(0) I(0)
Note: I(0) and I(1) indicate that variables are integrated (stationary)











Table 2.4 presents our results which show that all the variables are integrated
of either order one I(1) or other zero I(0). It is then certain that the ARDL
method is appropriate for our analysis. We therefore used the method to test for
the existence of a long run relationship in each of the following models:
(i) %health exp
total exp
= f(polity2; rpop; ln aid; ln pgdp; Under14)
(ii) per capita health exp = f(polity2; rpop; ln aid; ln pgdp; Under14
(iii) %welfare exp
gdp
= f((polity2; rpop; ln aid; ln gdp; Under14)
(iv) per capita health exp = f(polity2; rpop; aidk; pgdp; Under14)
(v) WT exp = f(polity2; rpop; ln aid; ln pgdp; Under14)
(vi) % capital exp
gdp
= f(polity2; rpop; ln aid; ln pgdp; Under14)
We present in Table 2.5 the results of our Bounds tests for the existence of
a long run relationship for six di¤erent equations of public expenditure and po-
litical competition. The F-statistics used for this were developed by Pesaran,
et al. (2001). The critical values are:10% Critical values:Lower- I(0) 2.26;Up-
per -I(1) 3.35; 5% Critical values:Lower-I(0),2.62; Upper -I(1) 3.79,1% Critical
values:Lower-I(0) 3.41; Upper I(1) 4.68;Since all the models except (v) are cointe-
grated we can proceed in our analysis of the long and short run estimates of each
of the cointegrated models below.
Table 2.6 presents the long run relationship between political competitions
and public expenditure using our public goods of interest. The table shows in
column (ii) that political power competition, measured by polity2, was positive
(0.0338) and statistically signicant at 5 per cent level. Electoral competition
from the result is associated with increase in health expenditure by about 0.03%
of total public expenditure. This result conrms political economistspredictions











Table 2.5: Bounds Tests for the existence of Cointegration
(i) (ii) (iii)







while *** p<0.01,** p<0.05, * p<0.1,indicates .
cointegration at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
expenditure on health as a percent of total public expenditure. Rural population
density and the log of foreign aid are both positive and statistically signicant
at 1 per cent level. From our result, an increase in rural population will lead to
about 0.01% increase in health expenditure as percentage of total expenditure.
On the other hand, increase in foreign aid is associated with an increase of 0.28%
in health expenditure as percentage of total expenditure. The proportion of the
country population under the age of 14 is negative and signicantly related to the
three measures of public expenditure. Public expenditure on health as percentage
of total expenditure will be lower by about 0.28% with an increase in the proportion
of the population belowf 14 years old.
However, per capita GDP, which is a measure of the countrys economic devel-
opment, does not seem to have a statistically signicant e¤ect on public expendi-
ture on health. Our result concerning welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP
is consistent with the theories of political economists. Political power competi-
tion, population density and the log of foreign aid show a positive and signicant
relationship at 1 percent level. However, the e¤ect of these variables on welfare ex-











Table 2.6: Long run relationship between public goods and political competitions
in Nigeria
Measures of Health expenditure Welfare expenditure Capital Expenditure
public goods % Total expenditure % GDP % GDP
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
polity2t 1 0.0338** 3.85e-06*** 7.58e-07
(0.0147) (1.14e-06) (3.04e-06)
rpopdensity 0.0145*** 2.72e-06*** 9.24e-06***
(0.00305) (2.37e-07) (6.31e-07)
Linaid 0.281*** 2.94e-05*** 2.94e-05
(0.102) (7.95e-06) (2.12e-05)
Linpgdp 0.0885 2.87e-05 -0.000141
(0.597) (4.64e-05) (0.000124)
under14 -0.279** -5.56e-05*** -0.000180***
(0.122) (9.51e-06) (2.53e-05)
Constant 4.834 0.00127** 0.00669***
(7.713) (0.000600) (0.00160)
Observations 45 45 45
R-squared 0.641 0.884 0.888
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
expenditure as a percentage of GDP conrms previous studies that politicians are
more willing to spend on current expenditures than on capital, because the for-
mer are immediately available and are of more political value during pre-election
periods (Rogo¤, 1990 and Vergne, 2009).
The results of our Error Correction Models (ECM), as presented in Table 2.7,
column (ii) - (iv) show that political competition has no signicant e¤ect on the
three measures of public goods. However, the log of foreign aid is positively re-
lated to health and welfare expenditure at 10 percent level of signicant. Our
result shows that public expenditure on health as a percentage of total expendi-
ture will rise by about 0.28% with an increase in foreign aid. This is partly due











at alleviating poverty. The most important component depicted in table 2.7 is the
lagged ECM which was signicant at 1 per cent and negative, as expected, and
further conrms the existence of a long run relationship in our models. Column
(ii) shows that about 70 per cent of deviation from the long run equilibrium path
of health expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure is corrected within a
year. Correction of any deviation from long run equilibrium path in welfare ex-
penditure as a percentage of GDP, is, however, slower at about 31 percent a year
while restoration to long run equilibrium path in capital expenditure as a per cent
of GDP will be achieved in one year.
Table 2.8 presents another dimension of public expenditure on public goods,
which is health expenditure as a percentage of GDP and per capita health expen-
diture. Once again, the Table shows that political competitions have a positive
long run relationship to both health expenditure as a percentage of GDP and per
capita health expenditure at 10 per cent level of signicant. Rural population den-
sity and per capita foreign aid are both positive and signicant at 1 per cent level.
However, the e¤ect of an increase in these variables are less than 1% increase in
health expenditure as per cent of GDP. Per capita GDP have no statistical signi-
cance in relation to both measures of health expenditure. Similar to our results in
Table 2.6, the dependency ratio (under14) was negative and signicantly related
to per capita health expenditure and total health expenditure as a percentage of
GDP. As the dependency population ratio increases, public expenditure on health
as a percentage of GDP declines.
Table 2.9 presents the ECM results of the two long run models shown in Table
2.8. Similar to our short run result shown in Table 2.7, rural population density











Table 2.7: Error Correction Models of Public Goods and Political Competitions
in Nigeria
Public goods Health expenditure Welfare expenditure Capital Expenditure
measures % Total expenditure % GDP % GDP
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
dpolity2 0.00341 9.79e-07 6.97e-06
(0.0197) (1.00e-06) (4.85e-06)
drpopdensity -0.0240 -2.02e-06** 7.10e-06*
(0.0172) (8.72e-07) (4.20e-06)
dLinaid 0.282* 1.37e-05* 2.76e-05
(0.155) (8.03e-06) (3.81e-05)
dLinpgdp 1.723* -4.43e-05 -0.000310
(1.007) (4.92e-05) (0.000235)
dunder14 0.158 -3.56e-05 -0.000148
(0.474) (2.46e-05) (0.000115)
ECMt 1 -0.699*** -0.307*** -1.020***
(0.141) (0.0893) (0.164)
Constant 0.0415 1.07e-05** 6.00e-06
(0.0779) (3.97e-06) (1.90e-05)
Diagonistic tests
X2Auto 0.6382 0.6310 0.5644
X2DW 1.899447 1.855292 2.018599
F-stat. 6.31 5.77 7.53
Observations 45 45 45
R-squared 0.472 0.477 0.543
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
5 percent level. While per capita foreign aid was positive and signicantly related
to health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, at 5 per cent level, it was positively
and signicantly related to per capita expenditure at 1 per cent level. As earlier
noted, most of the foreign aid is targeted at welfare related public expenditure
in developing countries, such as expenditure on health services. The sign of the
ECM was negative as expected and the size of its coe¢ cient suggests a higher
speed of adjustment for health expenditure as a percentage of GDP from the short











Table 2.8: Political competitions and public health expenditure in Nigeria
Health expenditure Per capita
















Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
expenditure. That is, about 41 per cent deviation from the long run expenditure
as a percentage of GDP is corrected each year, compared to about 27 percent for











Table 2.9: Error correction estimates of political competition and public health
expenditure in Nigeria
Health expenditure per capita





















Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.1 Parameter Stability Test
The above long run and short run relationship can be tested further with the aid
of cumulative sum (CUSUM), as proposed by Brown, et al. (1995) to determine
possibility of a structural break in our models of electoral competitions and the
various components of public expenditure. In other words, we are testing for the
stability of the parameters of the established long run relationship between our











the CUSUM method over others is that it is suitable for testing the stability of
parameter even if the point of the structural break is unknown, unlike the Chow
test. The method uses the cumulative sum of recursive residuals based on the rst
n observations which is then updated recursively and plotted against the break
point. The null hypothesis H0 for CUSUM test assumes that the parameters are
stable while the alternative hypothesis H1 assume instability of the parameter.
The decision rule is that, if the CUSUM plot falls within the 5 per cent critical
bound, the null hypothesis is accepted, if it however falls outside the 5 per cent
critical bound, then the null hypothesis of stability is rejected and we accept
the alternative hypothesis of instability in the parameters. Figure2.2 presents
the results of our analysis, with clear evidence of stability of the parameters in
our models. The CUSUM plots of the entire mod l lie within the 5 per cent
critical bound. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis of stability but reject the























2.2 Sub-national electoral competitions and pro-
vision of public goods in Nigeria
In the remaining part of this paper we used panel data to examine the links
between electoral competition at sub-national level in Nigeria and the provision of
safe drinking water. It is the primary responsibility of the state governments in
the country to provide safe drinking water to citizens. We present a graph of the
37 statespublic expenditure trends between 1990 and 2010 in Figure2.3
The graph clearly shows evidence of a rapid increase in public expenditure
immediately after the transition from military rule to democratic rule in 1999.
Annual public expenditure (real) for the states was below N50, 000 billions in the
10 years under military rule but rose to a maximum of N400,000 billions in the rst
10 years of democratic rule. However, whether the above increase in the states
real public expenditure translates to an increase in the provision of public goods,
especially safe drinking water, is the focus of our next discussion. Figure2.4 is a
pictorial illustration of women su¤ering due to lack of safe drinking water.
Drinking water can easily be provided within one to two years through massive
public expenditure on Boreholes . On average, it takes less than a week to complete
the drilling of a bore hole in Nigeria (Adekile & O. Olabode, 2009). If the elected
leaders of the states are responsive to the need for basic services in the country,
we expect access to safe drinking water to have improved in the country within
the ten years under consideration.
From our results, shown in Table 2.10, lagged provision of water, as expected,
was positively and signicantly related to the provision of safe drinking water in
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Table 2.10: Political competitions and provision of drinking water in Nigeria
Variables Access to piped and borehole Water
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
watert 1 0.345* 0.324** 0.333* 0.324**
(0.180) (0.161) (0.174) (0.161)
executive competition -0.606 -0.586
(1.078) (1.087)
legislative competition -2.992** -2.459*
(1.437) (1.345)
rural -0.168 -0.141 -0.162 -0.141
(0.158) (0.166) (0.156) (0.166)
population 3.08e-06 3.31e-06 3.13e-06 3.31e-06
(4.32e-06) (4.26e-06) (4.42e-06) (4.26e-06)
pgdp 0.0347*** 0.0412*** 0.0376*** 0.0412***
(0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0137)
opposition 3.098 2.905
(5.080) (4.963)
rain 0.0524** 0.0597** 0.0531** 0.0597**
(0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0264) (0.0259)
democracy dummy -18.46*** -15.55***
(5.134) (3.728)
national party -3.863 -2.905
(5.004) (4.963)
Observations 111 111 111 111
Number of id 37 37 37 37
Standard errors in parentheses,*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
negative e¤ect on the provision of safe drinking water was signicant at the 5 per
cent level. Per capita GDP as expected was positively and signicantly related to
the provision of safe drinking water. An increase in the States per capita GDP is
associated with about 0.04 increase in households access to drinking water. States
with a higher GDP are more capable of providing safe drinking water to their
citizens. Average rain fall in the state as expected was positive and signicantly











the States is associated with about 0.05 increase in householdsaccess to drinking
water. It is therefore necessary for the Federal Government to nancially support
states with lower average rain fall in order to improve provision of safe drinking
water in such states. Our dummy for democracy has negative and signicant re-
lationship with households access to safe drinking water in the country. It clearly
shows that provision of safe drinking water was worse-o¤ in the rst ten years of
electoral competitions in the country, which was primarily due to the problem of
political capture at the state levels. Transition from military to democratic rule
was associated with about 18 per cent decrease in access to drinking water.
2.3 Conclusion and policy implication
In this paper, we considered a long run relationship between political power com-
petition and public expenditure on public goods in Nigeria using the recently
developed Bounds Testing Approach to cointegration. From our ndings, we es-
tablish the existence of a long run positive and signicant relationship between
political power competition and health expenditure per capita, health expenditure
as a percentage of total expenditure and welfare expenditure as a percentage of
GDP. However, our results show that no signicant positive relationship exists be-
tween political power competitions and capital expenditure in the country. This,
we argue, may be due to the excessive targeted spending of democratic leaders in
the country with the aim of satisfying the electorate and winning subsequent elec-
tions5. This result shows that public expenditure on public goods may still be high
5For instance, recurrent expenditure of the 2012 federal government budget was over 72 per
cent of the total government estimated total public expenditure. In most cases, government











in developing countries despite the presence of non-credible electoral competitions
and special interest groups capture.
In the State panel analysis, we considered the relationship between sub-national
electoral competition in Nigeria and provision of safe drinking water to the citizens.
Although real public expenditure rapidly rose between 1999 and 2008, our results
clearly show that access to safe drinking water did not improve in the country
subsequent to transition to democratic rule in 1999. The problem of political
capture and diversion of public funds to private pockets is common at both the
sub national level and the national level.
Policy implications of our results are that transition to democratic rule is not
enough for improvement in the provision of public goods without credible electoral
competitions. Therefore, political leaders, especially in Nigeria, should put em-
phasis on credible electoral competition rather than on a change in political power
from military to civilian rule. In addition, political leaders should go beyond in-
creasing public expenditure to actual delivery of basic services in order to improve













Use of Anthropometric Measures
to Analyze How Sources f
Drinking Water and Sanitation
A¤ect Childrens Health in
Nigeria
Abstract
We use 2008 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) datasets to construct child
height- and weight-for-age Z-scores and use regression analysis to analyze the ef-
fects of di¤erent sources of drinking water and sanitation on child health outcomes
in Nigeria. We also calculate the probability of a child being stunted or under-











results show that both child height- and weight Z-scores are positive and signi-
cantly related to access to borehole and piped water, and negative and signicant
for access to well water. The probabilities of a child being stunted or underweight
are both signicantly lower for children drinking borehole or piped water, whereas
well water has a positive and signicant e¤ect on these measures of child health.
Childrens access to ush toilets is positive and signicantly related to child
height- and weight-for-age Z-scores, but the same measures are negatively related
to childrens use of pit latrines. In line with this, the probability of a child being
stunted or underweight is negative and signicantly related to access to ush toi-
lets, but positively related with pit latrines. Our results suggest that increasing
access to safe drinking water and ush toilets for households will signicantly re-
duce the high incidence of malnutrition and water-borne diseases among children
in Nigeria and should be a high priority for policy makers.
The safety and accessibility of drinking water are major concerns
throughout the world. Health risks may arise from consumption of wa-
ter contaminated with infectious agents, toxic chemicals, and radio-
logical hazards. Improving access to safe drinking water can result in
tangible improvements to health. - UN Water Initiative (2010)
Lack of access to safe water and adequate sanitation puts children
at high risk of not living beyond his/her fth birthday, but those who
survive serious illness (due to water-related diseases) often do not reach
their full physical, intellectual, and social potential due to the e¤ects of












Access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation is essential for healthy
life and can signicantly reduce public expenditure on preventable diseases and
epidemics (e.g., cholera, diarrhea, typhoid, and dracunculiasis) arising from con-
taminated drinking water and unhygienic disposal of human waste. According to
the World Health Organization (WHO 2007), about 1.7 million deaths annually
are related to drinking unsafe water and poor disposal of human waste. Children
are the most vulnerable, due to their low natural immunity, and a high percent-
age of infant mortality and morbidity is linked to contaminated water and lack
of hygienic sanitation. Various studies in di¤erent countries have shown that the
quality of drinking water is positively associated with reductions in diarrhea and
mortality (Cutler and Miller 2005; Clasen et al. 2007; Arnold and Colford 2007;
Kremer et al. 2009).
Recent research also shows that drinking unsafe water and poor disposal of
waste a¤ects the growth rate of children and may eventually determine their in-
tellectual and physical contribution to economic development (Kingdon and Monk
2010; Deaton 2008; WHO,2007). Over 1.1 billion people worldwide, most of them
in developing countries, lacked access to safe drinking water in 2007 (UNDP, 2008;
WHO, 2007).
In this paper, we look at how access to di¤erent sources of drinking water
and sanitation a¤ects Nigerian childrens height-for-age Z-scores and weight-for-
age Z-scores. We focus on the e¤ects of drinking water from di¤erent sources on
childrens health, which is particularly important, given the low quality of well











that the water in about 84 percent of wells contains highly concentrated nitrate,
which has severe adverse e¤ects on human health (Adelana and Olasehinde 2003;
2008).
Nigerian children below the age of 5 years make up 17 percent of the 1.8 million
deaths due to poor sanitation globally (UNICEF, Nigeria, 2010). In 2010, 11 states
in Nigeria battled an extended cholera epidemic; of the 38,173 cases reported from
JanuaryOctober 2010, some 1,555 were conrmed dead (Paula, 2010). Between
1999 and 2008, over US$6 billion of public funds has been devoted to the provision
of safe drinking water and improved sanitation and health related services by the
federal government, excluding states and local governmentscontributions (CBN,
2009). What is not clear, however, is the quality of water the government has
been providing and its e¤ects on the health outcomes of children. In this paper,
we specically try to establish the relationship between householdsaccess to safe
drinking water (piped and borehole water) and level of sanitation, and the health
outcomes of children in Nigeria. We want to o¤er some insight into how well
the public expenditures for drinking water and sanitation are beneting Nigerian
citizens, especially children. Previous studies on the e¤ects of water and sanitation
on childrens health outcomes have not been conclusive, and we are not aware of
any such study for Nigeria (Christiaensen and Alderman 2004; Strauss and Thomas
1995).
Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa, with an estimated 150 million
people. Although the country is rich in both human and natural resources, about
71 percent of the population lives on less than US$ 1 dollar a day and about
92 percent lives on less than $2 dollars a day. Nigeria has the worlds second











1 million children annually (191 per 1,000 children). Infant mortality is as high as
86 per 1,000 live births (UNICEF, Nigeria, 2010).
In terms of human development, the United Nation Human Development Index
ranked Nigeria 158 out of 177 countries in 2007. The 2010 theme of the UNs
annual water day, "Clean Water for a Healthy World," speaks volumes about the
importance of safe drinking water across the globe. However, about 42 percent
of Nigerias population has no access to clean drinking water, making up almost
20 percent of those in Africa in this situation (UNICEF, Nigeria, 2010). The
implication of this is that Nigerian children are exposed to deadly but preventable
water-borne diseases, which a¤ects their growth and health in general (Kingdon
and Monk 2010).
Regarding sanitation, none of the successive governments in Nigeria have taken
responsibility for the provision of sanitation services to its citizens. Most houses
are built without toilet facilities, in both rural and urban areas. It is rare to nd
rural houses with personal toilets, and urban houses with 50 or more tenants may
share one toilet. In 2008, the government, for the rst time, promised to construct
1 million public latrines across Nigeria to serve more than 150 million people, but
these needed facilities have not yet materialized.
The majority of the poor who struggle to survive do not consider access to
a toilet as crucial, yet diarrhea remains the second largest cause of childrens
deaths in Nigeria (UN Water Initiative, 2010). In the 1980s, during military rule,
sanitary workers were responsible for monitoring household sanitation both in
rural and urban areas, but due to shifts in government priorities this service, was
discontinued by the new regime.











this paper. Healthier citizens are likely going to be more productive and contribute
positively to economic development of the country, all things being equal. In
addition, good health also has a positive e¤ect on the learning attitude and abilities
of children and leads to better educational outcomes and increases the e¢ ciency
of human capital development by individuals, household and the nation (Strauss
and Thomas, 1998; Schultz, 1999). Illness reduces physical, mental and income
ability of the populace and their economic usefulness. However, children are the
most vulnerable group in the society. One of the most important functions of
government is to protect the rights of every child, especially health. When a
childs health is guaranteed the future of such a child and the country at large is
protected.
This paper makes four main contributions to the literature. First, to the best
of our knowledge, all other studies have used the incidence of diseases to explain
child health outcomes in Nigeria: ours is the rst to employ anthropometric mea-
sures. This non-monetary measure of malnutrition is not a¤ected by the problem
of reliable deators often associated with other methods. Second, our study is the
rst to examine the e¤ects of di¤erent sources of drinking water at the household
level on the health outcomes of children below the age of ve years in Nigeria. This
is signicant, considering the high infant mortality associated with contaminated
drinking water. Third, this paper also di¤ers from previous studies because we use
both height- and weight-for-age Z-scores to determine the probability of stunted
growth and of being underweight, respectively, as proxies for malnutrition in the
country. While stunted growth is a measure of chronic malnutrition, being under-
weight is a measure of general malnutrition (Silva 2005). Last, this paper is the











toilets) on the probability of stunted growth and of being underweight in children
in Nigeria.
3.0.2 Literature Review
Several studies have attempted to analyze the e¤ects of access to clean water, im-
proved sanitation, and other socioeconomic factors on childrens health outcomes
using a variety of measures. Most of these studies use either infant mortality
or incidence of diarrhea as measures of child health outcomes. These studies do
not examine the e¤ects of access to water and sanitation on childrens height and
weight z-scores. But better the anthropometric measures which are far better are
now available through Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) datasets and the
WHO Child Growth Standards.
In their review, Esrey et al. (1991) attribute a 17 percent reduction in the
incidence of diarrhea to childrens access to improved water supply, and a further
22 percent reduction to better sanitation. In another Meta study, Fewtrell et al.
(2005) also report a 25 percent reduction in illness as a result of improved access to
safe drinking water and a 32 percent reduction to better sanitation. Waddington
et al. (2009), on the other hand, shows that improved sanitation led to a reduction
of 37 percent in the incidence of diarrhea, but improved water accessibility had no
signicant e¤ect on the incidence of this disease.
Esrey (1996) used DHS datasets in a cross-country analysis of eight countries.
His study established a 13-44 percent reduction in diarrhea could be attained with
provision of access to ush toilets and an 8.5 percent reduction with provision











health than access to clean drinking water. However, Gunther and Fink (2010)
criticized this study because it included only 8 countries of the 63 countries with
available DHS datasets in 1995. In response to this shortcoming in the work
of Esrey (1996), and with the availability of new datasets, Gunther and Fink
(2010) used 172 datasets from 70 countries to analyze the e¤ects of access to safe
drinking water and sanitation on infant mortality and morbidity. Their cross-
country analysis showed that access to improved water and sanitation reduced the
incidence of diarrhea in children less than ve years by 5-17 percent and led to a
5-20 percent reduction in infant mortality.
While empirical studies on the e¤ects of access to sanitation and clean water
are rare in developing countries, there are some historical retrospective studies.
For instance, Woods, Watterson and Woodward (1988) relate reduced infant mor-
tality in both England and Wales in the 19th century to an increase in access
to improved water and sanitation. In a similar study in the United States, a 50
percent reduction in infant mortality in the 20th century is attributed to improved
water and 75 percent reduction is attributed to accessibility of sanitation (Cut-
ler and Miller 2005). However, Gunther and Fink (2010) observe that it is very
di¢ cult to establish causal relationships in these studies because their historical
nature may not account for some unobservable variables at that time.
Dasgupta (2004) analyzes diarrhea morbidity in the slums of Delhi. His results
show that access to piped water reduces the probability of the incidence of diarrhea.
Surprisingly, however, he concluded that access to sanitation and education of the
household head has no signicant e¤ect on illness. In another study in India,
Jalan and Ravallion (2003) examined the e¤ects of access to clean water on the











reduced the incidence of diarrhea, but the result is sensitive to familiesincomes
and education of mothers. Other studies that use diarrhea as a measure of health
in relation to access to water include Bozkurt, et al. (2003), Van der Hoek, et al.
(2001), Rao et al. (1998) and Alberini, et al. (1996).
However, the above studies do not specically focus on childrens growth rates.
Skouas (1998) uses 1994 cross-sectional data to analyze the e¤ect of environmental
and socioeconomic factors on the growth of children between ages 0 and 5 years
in Romania. His measures of childrens health outcomes are height- and weight-
for-age Z-scores. His results are not conclusive, but he found that poor sanitary
conditions are negatively related to childrens health.
Kabubo-Mariara, et al. (2008), use DHS datasets from Kenya to analyze the
determinants of childrens nutritional status. Surprisingly, their results show that
childrens growth is either insignicant or negatively related to access to water,
measured by cluster shares of households with piped water. On the other hand,
childrens height has a negative relati nship to the share of cluster households
with access to traditional toilets, but stunted growth is positively related to access
to traditional toilets. This result contradicts Silvas (2005) ndings in Ethiopia,
where access to water and sanitation was found to have positive e¤ects on childrens
height and weight z-scores. The e¤ect may partly depend on the type of access
to drinking water that households use. While Kabubo-Mariara et al. (2008) used
cluster shares of households with access to piped water and sanitation, Silva (2005)
used both individual and community access to water and sanitation. Mangyo
(2008) studied the e¤ects of access to water on childrens health in China using a
dynamic panel model. His results show that access to in-yard water sources only











e¤ects of access to water on child health are inconclusive.
3.0.3 Empirical Model Specication
Like previous studies on the relationship between environmental variables and
child health outcomes (Skouas 1998; Kabubo-Mariara et al. 2008; Jalan and
Ravallion 2003; Khanna 2008), our model is based on the theories of human capital
investment, as well as the household production function as specied by Kabubo-
Mariara, et al. (2008). A household is faced with a utility function, U , which
depends on the consumption of a vector of commodities, X, and a vector of leisure,
L:
(1) U = u(X;L)
The household production function for the goods consumed depends on a vec-
tor of inputs supplied by the household. A rational household chooses an optimal
consumption bundle, given that the production function and the budget constraint
do not exceed total income. The assumption of perfect substitution between home
production and market goods in the household model is further relaxed to model
human capital outcomes because most human capital outcomes cannot be pur-
chased in the market. Other considerations in the household production function
are the inuence of biological, demographic, and economic factors.
A typical childs health outcome is a product of the biological production func-
tion, which is a¤ected by the households decisions on inputs, such as nutrient
intake and general care. The ability of each household to maximize the health of a
child depends on available resources and the information constraints facing them.











the supply of growth Y for each child in order to model child health outcome. It is
assumed that good health is desirable in its own right and that other reasons are
the basis for household decisions on consumption (Kabubo-Mariara et al. 2008).
A modication of equation (1) based on the above assumption is:
(2) U = u(X;L; Y )
Thus, our budget constraint is modied to include child health production
function inputs. The constrained utility function is then solved for optimal quan-
tities of child health supplies in the market. In this framework, the reduced form
function for each childs health supply is:
(3) YI = f(Xi; Xe; Xh; Ui)
Equation (4) is a linear regression function of equation (3):
(4) Yi = a+ 1Xi + 2Xe + 3Xh + Ui
where Yi is the childs health outcomes represented by height- and weight-for-
age Z-scores, respectively. Xi is a vector of child-specic characteristics, such as
age, age squared (to control for non-linearity between the age of the child and
health outcomes), gender ( girls grow faster than boys at early age), single birth
(an only child), and multiple births (twin children). Xe is a vector of environmen-
tal variables, in this case including piped water, borehole water, and sanitation
(ush toilets and pit latrines) (Kabubo-Mariara et al. 2008; Jalan and Ravallion
2003; Khanna 2008). Xh is a vector of household-specic characteristics, such
as education of parents, household food index, mothers years of education, and
whether the household is located in a rural or urban area. Ui is the e¤ect of unob-
servable variables on the childs health, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with












3.0.4 Measuring Childrens Heights and Weights for-age
z-scores




whereH is the measured height of the child,MH is the age- and gender-specic
median heights of a well-nourished child, and  is the standard deviation of height
of a well-nourished child.
Weight-for-age Z-score: Z = Y X

where Y is the childs specic measured weight, X is the age- and gender-
specic median weights of a well-nourished child, and  is the standard deviation
of weight of a well-nourished reference child.
3.0.5 Hypotheses
We approached our study with two basic hypotheses. One, there is a positive
relationship between the quality of drinking water and sanitation that children are
exposed to, and their height- and weight-for-age Z-scores. Access to piped water,
borehole water, and ush toilets, which improve hygiene, should have a positive
e¤ect on childrens health outcomes. Conversely, the e¤ects of access to only well
water and pit latrines on these health outcomes should be negative.
Two, in line with the rst hypothesis, greater access to safe drinking water
and hygienic sanitation facilities will negatively impact the probability of stunted











3.0.6 Data Sources and Method of Estimation
Our main source of data is the 2008 DHS dataset for Nigeria, which has data
on households access to water and sanitation. The dataset contains informa-
tion about children aged 05 years in each household, including their weight and
height. It also contains information about the parents and the socioeconomic char-
acteristics of the household. We also used the WHO Child Growth Standards for
our analysis, plus the WHOs age- and gender-specic median weight and height
measures (and their standard deviations) for a well-nourished child.
We rst adjusted for the sampling methods and then used OLS (ordinary least
squares) regressions to analyze the e¤ects of access to water and sanitation on
childrens height- and weight-for-age Z-scores. (See results in tables 3.1 and 3.2
below, columns 1 and 2.) We further analyzed the probability of a child being
stunted and underweight, using survey probit regression methods. By adjusting
for the sampling methods, we controlled for the e¤ects of sample design in collect-
ing the primary data: sampling weights, clustering, and stratication (Statacorp
2009). Failure to account for sampling weights, according to Kabubo-Mariara, et
al. (2008), will a¤ect standard errors and yield-biased estimators; in addition,
if clustered observations are not independent, using ordinary least squares may
result in small standard errors.
DHS data collection does not involve purely random sampling, because di¤erent
groups of clusters are separately sampled. The solution to this problem is to apply
survey regression techniques to the data in order to produce the correct standard
errors (Kabubo-Mariara, et al. 2008), as we do for this research. More simply,











variable for our probit regressions.
We analyze the e¤ects of householdsaccess to safe drinking water and san-
itation on the probability of children being stunted and underweight. A child
is considered stunted if his or her height-for-age Z-score is less than -2, and un-
derweight if the weight-for-age Z-score is less than -2. Our dummy variable for
stunting is 1 if a childs height-for-age Z-score is less than -2, and 0 otherwise.
The dummy variable for underweight is 1 if the weight-for-age Z-score is less than
-2, and 0 if it is equal or greater than -2. This is the international child growth
standard recommended by WHO and used by most studies (Kabubo-Mariara et al.
2008; Khanna 2008; Silva 2005; Skouas 1998). We use survey probit regressions
to estimate the probability of a child being stunted and being underweight.
3.0.7 Regression Results
In table 3.1 and 3.2 we present the results of our analysis of the e¤ects of di¤erent
sources of water and sanitation on the heights and weights for-age z-scores of
children in Nigeria. In columns 3 and 5 in all our tables, we substituted well
water for piped and borehole water to test for robustness. In table 3.1, column 2,
we examine the e¤ect of household access to drinking water (piped and borehole
water) and sanitation (pit latrine and ush toilets) on a childs height-for-age Z-
score. The coe¢ cients and the signs of age in months and age squared are both
instructive from our results in table 3.1 and 3.2 columns 2 to 4. The signicant
negative coe¢ cient of age and signicant positive coe¢ cient of age squared at 1
percent level respectively shows that HAZ increases at a decreasing slope with age











age has a statistically negative non-linear relationship with HAZ, while there is
negative linear relationship between HAZ and age squared. Our results further
suggests that although Nigerian children have a great disadvantage at birth, they
tend to catch up somewhat over time.The results show that the male dummy and
multiple birth child (twin dummy) are both negatively related to a childs height
for-age z-score. This result is consistent with the ndings of Kabubo-Mariara, et
al. (2008). In other words these variables are inversely related to the height-for-
age Z-score of a child; this nding is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level.
Young children are thus less likely to be stunted if they obtain su¢ cient breast milk
for their feeding when newborn. However, as a childs age increases, weaning from
breast milk makes them more vulnerable to malnutrition. Our ndings indicate
that the height-for-age Z-score of a boy is likely to be 0.22 less than that of a girl.
The heights of twin children are likely to be 0.34 z-scores less than single
births (non-twin children). This result is signicant at 1 per cent level in all our
specications and consistent with the theory that twin children are generally more
disadvantaged than single children, due to insu¢ cient breast feeding (Sahn and
Stifel 2002b; 2003a; Kabubo-Mariara et al. 2008). Households food consumption
index was positively related to childrens height z-scores and signicant at 5 per
cent level.
We now turn to the e¤ects of environmental variables on childrens height-for-
age Z-scores. The e¤ect of access to borehole water is stronger and signicant
while piped water has no signicant e¤ects on childrens height-for-age Z-scores,
from our results. Access to borehole water is positively related to childrens height
z-scores and signicant at 1 per cent level from our OLS estimate. Similarly, the











Table 3.1: E¤ects of Sources of Water and Sanitation on Childrens Height for age
z-scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES HAZ-OLS HAZ-well HAZ-xed e¤ects HAZ-xed e¤ects-well
age in months -0.0893*** -0.0894*** -0.0851*** -0.0852***
(0.00401) (0.00401) (0.00444) (0.00445)
age squared 0.00121*** 0.00121*** 0.00115*** 0.00115***
(6.82e-05) (6.82e-05) (7.13e-05) (7.14e-05)
gender (male=1) -0.207*** -0.208*** -0.225*** -0.225***
(0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0384) (0.0384)
child is twin -0.338*** -0.341*** -0.287*** -0.290***
(0.0641) (0.0641) (0.0734) (0.0732)
food index 0.0118** 0.0117** 0.00678 0.00670
(0.00563) (0.00563) (0.00655) (0.00655)




ush toilet 0.396*** 0.424*** 0.326*** 0.347***
(0.0685) (0.0671) (0.0832) (0.0821)
pit latrine 0.0232 0.0438 0.0213 0.0400
(0.0398) (0.0396) (0.0576) (0.0574)
had fever -0.0804* -0.0811* -0.0836 -0.0825
(0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0509) (0.0508)
mothers height 0.0242*** 0.0241*** 0.0280*** 0.0279***
(0.00241) (0.00241) (0.00324) (0.00324)
mothers education 0.100*** 0.0986*** 0.0912*** 0.0893***
(0.0233) (0.0233) (0.0290) (0.0292)
urban 0.218*** 0.230*** 0.256*** 0.261***
(0.0441) (0.0428) (0.0682) (0.0650)
North central -0.228*** -0.232*** -0.214*** -0.216***
(0.0636) (0.0635) (0.0815) (0.0813)
North east -0.183*** -0.179*** -0.165* -0.156*
(0.0651) (0.0651) (0.0893) (0.0895)
North west -0.261*** -0.242*** -0.231*** -0.211**
(0.0666) (0.0668) (0.0862) (0.0860)
South east 0.392*** 0.383*** 0.434*** 0.424***
(0.0750) (0.0747) (0.0885) (0.0877)
South south 0.0764 0.0580 0.0759 0.0653
(0.0692) (0.0693) (0.0814) (0.0817)
well water -0.123*** -0.129**
(0.0369) (0.0538)
Constant -4.146*** -4.068*** -4.769*** -4.686***
(0.387) (0.387) (0.519) (0.521)
Observations 16,791 16,791 16,791 16,791
R-squared 0.082 0.083 0.085 0.085











a child drinking water from a well.
Regarding sanitation, access to pit latrines and ush toilets are both positive
determinants of childrens height z-scores in the country. On the other hand,
access to a ush toilet is both a signicant and positive determinant of childrens
height-for-age Z-scores. Access to ush toilets is statistically signicant at the 1
percent level. The height Z-score of a child with access to a ush toilet will be 0.4
higher than a child with no access to a ush toilet. This nding strongly supports
the argument that safe disposal of human waste is essential for the healthy life
and adequate growth of children. Our result agrees with that of Silva (2005), but
contradicts the ndings of Kabubo-Mariara, et al. (2008). Incidence of fever, as
expected, is negatively related to a childs height z-score. OLS estimate shows that
a child that has fever will be about 0.08 height z-scor less than a healthy child at
the 10 per cent signicance level.
The height of a childs mother is a positive and signicant determinant of a
childs height-for-age Z-score. The height of the mother captures genetic e¤ects and
other family background characteristics (Kabubo-Mariara, et al. 2008). Mothers
levels of education are both positive and signicant in determining the nutritional
status of children. When mothers are educated, they have better information on
childrens health care and generally earn higher incomes than mothers who are not
educated. This is one of the reasons why investment in human capital, especially
that of women, has great importance, given the pivotal role that women play in
the upbringing of children. Children in urban areas have higher height z-scores
than those in rural areas, from our estimates. This may be due to the fact that












Our control for geopolitical variation in height z-scores shows that children in
the three geopolitical zones in the north have lower height z-scores compared to the
children in the South Western zone. Children in the South Eastern geopolitical
zone have signicantly lower height z-scores compare, to children in the South
West.
We substituted well water for piped water and borehole water in columns 3,
to check for the robustness of the e¤ects of sources of drinking water on a childs
height-for-age Z-score, shown in column 2. Results and signicance levels of all
the variables remained the same as earlier explained above. However, drinking
of well water is negative and signicantly related to a childs height Z-score at 1
per cent level from column 3. The result suggests that a childs height Z-score is
likely to be lower by 0.12 Z-scores if a child drinks well water. This result shows
the urgent need for the government to invest more in substituting well water with
safer drinking water options in the country.
We controlled for cluster and state xed e¤ects in column 4 and 5 respectively
to further check for the robustness of our estimates in column 2 and 3. The results
and signicance levels remained unchanged. All other variables maintained their
signs, as in column 2 and 3 but with minor changes in the level of signicance of
some variables, such as borehole access, fever, and region (North East and North
West. Our variable of interest, drinking of well water, remained signicant at 5
per cent level and negatively related to height z-scores.
In table 3.2, we present the results of the e¤ects of householdsaccess to di¤er-
ent sources of drinking water and sanitation on childrens weight-for-age Z-scores.
The results here echo the ndings on height z-scores above. The signicant neg-











percent level respectively shows that WAZ increases at a decreasing slope with age
of a child, due to non-linear relationship between age and WAZ. In other words,
age has a statistically negative non-linear relationship with WAZ, while there is
positive linear relationship between WAZ and age squared. Our results further
show that both, being male and twin, have a negative e¤ect on a child weight
z-score. These two variables are negative and statistically signicant determinants
of childrens weight Z-scores at 1 per cent level.
The male dummy variable indicates that boys are 0.19 lower in weight-for-age
Z-scores than girls. . Once again, twin children are 0.27 lower in weight Z-scores
compare to non-twin children (single births). Our result is consistent with previous
studies on childrens weight z-scores (Kabubo-Mariara et al. 2008; Khanna 2008;
Silva 2005; and Skouas 1998). The food index is positively and signicantly
related to weight z-scores at 1 per cent level, from our results shown in column 2
and 3. As expected, food consumption is an important determinant of childrens
weight z-scores in the country.
Childrens access to borehole water is surprisingly negatively related to childs
weight Z-score and signicant at 10 per cent level. The e¤ects of this source of
drinking water is partly due to the fact that borehole water is generally not treated
in Nigeria because of the public belief that it is clean and hygienic for drinking.
The signicance of improved sanitation on childrens health is reected by
the coe¢ cient for ush toilets. Access to ush toilets is positive and statistically
signicant at the 1 percent level in relation to a childs weight-for-age Z-score, from
our results shown in column 2 and 3. Children that live in households with access
to ush toilets have 0.13 higher weight z-scores than children with no access to











Table 3.2: E¤ects of Sources of Water and Sanitation on Childrens Weight for age
z-scores in Nigeria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES WAZ-OLS WAZ-well WAZ-xed e¤ects WAZ-xed e¤ects-well
age in months -0.0547*** -0.0547*** -0.0505*** -0.0504***
(0.00281) (0.00281) (0.00316) (0.00316)
age squared 0.000730*** 0.000730*** 0.000677*** 0.000676***
(4.82e-05) (4.82e-05) (5.03e-05) (5.03e-05)
gender (male=1) -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.180*** -0.180***
(0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0254) (0.0254)
child is twin -0.275*** -0.274*** -0.263*** -0.262***
(0.0462) (0.0462) (0.0599) (0.0599)
food index 0 .0137*** 0.0136*** 0.0119** 0.0119**
(0.00397) (0.00397) (0.00508) (0.00506)




ush toilet 0.133*** 0.130*** 0.140** 0.134**
(0.0489) (0.0480) (0.0626) (0.0630)
pit latrine 0.0866*** 0.0897*** 0.0613 0.0617
(0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0460) (0.0450)
had fever -0.261*** -0.262*** -0.265*** -0.266***
(0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0362) (0.0363)
mothers weight 0.0191*** 0.0190*** 0.0187*** 0.0185***
(0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00142) (0.00142)
mothers education 0.212*** 0.207*** 0.206*** 0.201***
(0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0223) (0.0224)
urban 0.0667** 0.0602** 0.0936* 0.0829
(0.0315) (0.0306) (0.0527) (0.0507)
North central -0.0459 -0.0343 -0.0548 -0.0378
(0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0585) (0.0583)
North east -0.428*** -0.419*** -0.472*** -0.456***
(0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0632) (0.0626)
North west -0.524*** -0.504*** -0.478*** -0.453***
(0.0474) (0.0476) (0.0665) (0.0676)
South east 0.196*** 0.157*** 0.216*** 0.180***
(0.0537) (0.0536) (0.0630) (0.0617)
South south 0.167*** 0.145*** 0.132** 0.114**
(0.0492) (0.0493) (0.0564) (0.0559)
well water -0.110*** -0.111***
(0.0261) (0.0419)
Constant -1.394*** -1.352*** -1.415*** -1.373***
(0.0762) (0.0771) (0.0989) (0.102)
Observations 18,779 18,779 18,779 18,779
R-squared 0.141 0.142 0.144 0.144











Z-scores and signicant at 1 per cent level. It is clearly necessary to encourage
households to invest in ush toilets to prevent outbreaks of disease and improve
childrens heath, especially given childrens low immunity. Incidence of fever is
negatively related to childs weight z-score and signicant at 1 per cent level. A
clean environment normally facilitated by proper disposal of waste and access to
hygienic drinking water will reduce the incidence of fever commonly associated
with mosquito bites in the country.
The weight of the mother is a positive and signicant determinant of a childs
weight-for-age Z-scores. The variable is signicant at the 1 percent level of signi-
cance. The levels of education of a childs mother are also a positive and signicant
determinant of childrens weight Z-score, which is 0.2 higher if the mother is ed-
ucated. Children in urban areas have 0.07 weight z-scores than children in the
rural areas. We also noticed di¤erences based on region, that is, in which country
geopolitical zone the household is located. hildren in two Northern geopolitical
zones (North east and North west) have lower weight z-scores compared to their
counterparts in the South West. However, children in South East and South-South
zones have higher weight z-scores than children in the South West zone.
Lastly, when we substituted piped and borehole water with well water, shown
in column 3, we found that a child who drinks water from a well has 0.11 weight-
for-age Z-score lower than a child who obtains water from a borehole. The signs
and the level of our variables are consistent even when we make adjustments for
state and clusters xed e¤ects in column 4 and 5.
Though our analysis on the relationship between sources of drinking water
and sanitation and the z-scores of children are instructive, we carried out further











probability of wasting (being underweight) to fully understand the e¤ects of these
variables on childrens health outcomes.
As noted earlier, a child is considered to be stunted if his or her height for age z-
score is less than -2. As shown in Table 3.3, the signicant positive coe¢ cient of age
and signicant negative coe¢ cient of age squared at 1 percent level respectively
shows that probability of stunting increases at a decreasing slope with age of a
child, due to non-linear relationship between age and HAZ. In other words, age has
a statistically positive non-linear relationship with stunting partly due to weaning,
while there is negative linear relationship between HAZ and age squared. Male
dummy marginal e¤ects suggest that the probability of a child being stunted is
0.05 higher for boys than for girls at 1 per cent signicance level. Multiple birth
children are more likely to be stunted than single birth children. The marginal
e¤ect shows that for twin children the probability of being stunted is 0.08 higher
than that of single birth children.
Access to borehole water is both negatively and signicantly related to proba-
bility of being stunted at the 1 percent statistical level, as depicted in column 2.
In line with this nding, the marginal e¤ect shows that the probability of being
stunted is 0.008 lower for a child with access to piped water than for a child with
access to well water. For a child who has access to borehole water, the probability
of being stunted is about 0.03 Z-scores lower than for a child who has access to
well water.
Children in households with access to ush toilets and pit latrines have a lower
probability of being stunted, as indicated from our results in column 2 to 4. Even
after controlling for state and cluster xed e¤ects, the marginal e¤ects in column 3











Table 3.3: Determinants of Probability of Stunting in Nigeria
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
VARIABLES stunting probability Stunting probability (xed e¤ect)
piped well piped well
age in month 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0419*** 0.0420***
(0.000942) (0.000942) (0.00272) (0.00273)
age squared -0.000258*** -0.000258*** -0.000626*** -0.000626***
(1.60e-05) (1.60e-05) (4.51e-05) (4.51e-05)
gender (male=1)^ 0.0538*** 0.0538*** 0.142*** 0.143***
(0.00776) (0.00776) (0.0220) (0.0220)
child is twin^ 0.0770*** 0.0777*** 0.185*** 0.188***
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0465) (0.0464)
food index -0.00167 -0.00165 -0.00202 -0.00199
(0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00386) (0.00386)




ush toilet^ -0.0859*** -0.0911*** -0.200*** -0.211***
(0.0156) (0.0153) (0.0522) (0.0512)
pit latrine^ -0.00757 -0.0121 -0.0200 -0.0316
(0.00920) (0.00917) (0.0328) (0.0329)
had fever^ 0.0134 0.0136 0.0411 0.0402
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0300) (0.0299)
mothers height -0.00595*** -0.00593*** -0.0166*** -0.0166***
(0.000560) (0.000561) (0.00191) (0.00191)
mothers education -0.0372*** -0.0368*** -0.0937*** -0.0930***
(0.00545) (0.00545) (0.0168) (0.0169)
urban^ -0.0423*** -0.0440*** -0.129*** -0.131***
(0.0102) (0.00989) (0.0365) (0.0353)
North central 0.0492*** 0.0505*** 0.123*** 0.127***
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0475) (0.0474)
North east 0.0632*** 0.0623*** 0.171*** 0.168***
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0506) (0.0508)
North west 0.103*** 0.0989*** 0.254*** 0.246***
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0463) (0.0461)
South east -0.0969*** -0.0970*** -0.271*** -0.274***
(0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0543) (0.0541)
South south -0.0219 -0.0185 -0.0454 -0.0423
(0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0511) (0.0514)




Observations 16,791 16,791 16,791 16,791
For discrete variables(marked by ^),the coe¢ cients represent the change in probability
for a change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses











lower probability of being stunted compared to children with no access to ush
toilets. The probability of a child being stunted is between 0.03 and 0.09 points
lower when a childs mother is educated than when she is not educated, from our
OLS and xed e¤ects estimates shown in column 2 to 4. Children resident in
urban areas have a signicant lower probability of being stunted or su¤ering from
chronic malnutrition, compared to their rural counterparts.
Similar to our results in table 3.1 and 3.2, children in the three geopolitical zones
in the North have a signicantly higher probability of su¤ering chronic malnutrition
than children in the South-West zone, while the probability of stunting is lower in
the South East zone compared to the South-West. Finally, our results depicted in
column 3 and 5 also show that the probability of being stunted is about 0.05 points
higher for children who drink well water than those who drink piped or borehole
water. This conrms the negative e¤ects of drinking well water on childrens health
in Nigeria and that provision of alternative drinking water should be one of the
main priorities of the government.
We present the relationship between householdssources of drinking water and
sanitation and a childs probability of being underweight in Table 3.4. We substi-
tuted well water for piped and borehole water shown in column 2 and 4, while we
control for state and cluster xed e¤ects in column 3 and 4 for robustness check.
Most of the results in Table 3.4 are similar to our ndings on the probability of
stunting (shown in Table 3.3). We shall therefore limit our discussion here to the
e¤ects of sources of water and sanitation on childrens probability of being un-
derweight and any other variables with considerable di¤erent estimates from our
results in Table 3.3. The signicance of improve sanitation on children health is











Table 3.4: Determinants of Probability of Being Underweight in Nigeria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
underweight probability underweight probability (xed e¤ect)
VARIABLES piped water well piped water well
age in months 0.00905*** 0.00905*** 0.0258*** 0.0258***
(0.000797) (0.000797) (0.00255) (0.00255)
age squared -0.000132*** -0.000132*** -0.000387*** -0.000387***
(1.36e-05) (1.36e-05) (4.25e-05) (4.25e-05)
gender (male=1)^ 0.0469*** 0.0469*** 0.144*** 0.144***
(0.00658) (0.00658) (0.0217) (0.0217)
child is twin^ 0.0643*** 0.0643*** 0.218*** 0.218***
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0501) (0.0499)
food index -0.00342*** -0.00340*** -0.0103** -0.0103**
(0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00450) (0.00450)




ush toilet^ -0.0247* -0.0267* -0.0657 -0.0676
(0.0148) (0.0145) (0.0594) (0.0593)
pit latrine^ -0.0272*** -0.0292*** -0.0732** -0.0759**
(0.00777) (0.00776) (0.0366) (0.0359)
had fever^ 0.0533*** 0.0536*** 0.155*** 0.156***
(0.00948) (0.00949) (0.0310) (0.0311)
mothers weight -0.00449*** -0.00447*** -0.0134*** -0.0133***
(0.000322) (0.000322) (0.00147) (0.00146)
mothers education -0.0574*** -0.0562*** -0.172*** -0.169***
(0.00483) (0.00483) (0.0190) (0.0191)
urban^ -0.00862 -0.00878 -0.0506 -0.0487
(0.00902) (0.00874) (0.0445) (0.0426)
North central 0.0614*** 0.0591*** 0.191*** 0.183***
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0524) (0.0527)
North east 0.172*** 0.170*** 0.536*** 0.529***
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0516) (0.0513)
North west 0.201*** 0.195*** 0.545*** 0.532***
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0517) (0.0523)
South east -0.0184 -0.0102 -0.0610 -0.0420
(0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0582) (0.0572)
South south -0.00386 0.00123 -0.0142 -0.00570
(0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0530) (0.0532)




Observations 18,779 18,779 18,779 18,779
For discrete variables(marked by ^),the coe¢ cients represent the change in probability
for a changeof thedummy variable from 0 to 1. Standard errors in parentheses











on the probability of being underweight. The probability of being underweight for
children with access to ush toilets is between 0.24 and 0.7 lower than for children
with no access to ush toilets, as depicted in columns 1 to 4. However, the prob-
ability of children being underweight is between 0.03 to 0.6 higher when children
drink well water, compared to drinking piped or borehole water.
3.0.8 Conclusion and Policy Implications
In this chapter, we discussed the use of health z-scores of children aged 0-59 months
to analyze how sources of drinking water and types of sanitation in the country
a¤ect childrens growth. We in addition used probit regression analysis to ana-
lyze the contribution of the various sources of water and sanitation to probability
of stunting (chronic malnutrition) and the probability of being underweight for
children in the country. Looking at the implications of householdsaccess to safe
drinking water and sanitation on childrens health outcomes in this study, reveals
that householdsaccess to piped and borehole water are both positively related
to childrens height for-age Z-scores. Importantly, we nd that access to borehole
water is signicant and negatively related to childrens weight z-scores and the
probability of children being underweight. We argue that the quality of borehole
water in the country needs to be assessed to determine the main reason for the neg-
ative relationship access to this water source has on childrens health outcomes. In
the short term, however, policy makers should consider funding more piped water
throughout Nigeria for household use and at the same time improve the quality












In line with our ndings, access to proper human waste disposal systems, es-
pecially ush toilets, is crucial for the healthy growth of children in the country.
Children in households with access to ush toilets are less prone to chronic mal-
nutrition (inadequate growth). Our study also shows that access to ush toilets
reduces the probability of a child becoming stunted. The Nigerian government
should encourage both private and public investment in the provision of ush toi-
lets for households to reduce the problem of stunting and being underweight and
the frequent occurrences of cholera and other water-borne diseases that presently
ravage the country. Where provision of ush toilets is not immediately feasible,
it is necessary to provide, for the short term, pit latrines for households in the
country. Government should also propose a policy that will make construction of
toilet facilities in new buildings mandatory in the country.
Our study shows that drinking well water is harmful to the growth and health
of children in Nigeria and has increased the number of children being stunted and
underweight. This is a strong signal to the various tiers of government to expedite
e¤orts to provide safe drinking water to every household in the country. Womens
education is another area that clearly should be promoted and encouraged by the
government because of the positive impact of motherseducation on the health
outcomes of children.
If Nigeria and the other national governments of sub-Saharan Africa can pro-
vide improved drinking water and sanitation in the sub-region, the lives of millions
of children will be saved. Providing safe drinking water and better sanitation will
also increase both the physical and mental growth of children. Multiplier e¤ects
of adequate access to safe drinking water and sanitation include a healthier en-











economic growth due to the positive e¤ects of a healthy population.
Finally, we recommend further studies on the quality of borehole water in
Nigeria, for example, inquiries into ways to reduce the average cost of borehole
drilling, in addition to research to nd solutions to the persistence of water borne













During Political Transition in
Nigeria
Abstract
In this paper, we compare health inequalities in Nigeria under two forms of gov-
ernments. The country was under military rule for several years prior to the general
elections in April 1999. Using the DHS data sets of 1999 and 2008, our results
show that childhood malnutrition measured by negative height for-age z-scores
and negative weight-for age z-scores persisted and even deteriorated, after 1999 to
the disadvantage of children in poor households after 1999. While inequality in
stunting rose by 13.6 percent between 1999 and 2008 in the country, inequality in
being underweight increased by 20.9 percent within the same period. The result











decomposition of group di¤erences suggest that socioeconomic gaps in asset own-
ership, maternal and paternal level of education, food index, access to water and
sanitation are the main causes of the prevalence of stunting and being underweight
amongst poor children in Nigeria. We therefore argue that transition to democratic
rule without concerted e¤orts to reduce existing gaps in the determinants of health
outcomes does not benet the poor.
4.0.9 Introduction
Malnutrition is one of the major causes of infant mortality in developing coun-
tries. It accounted for over 3.7 million deaths among young children across the
globe in 2000 (WHO).The e¤ects of childhood malnutrition includes inadequate
mental development, poorer performance in schools, and subsequent inability of
malnourished children to reach their full potential later in life (Fujii, T. 2005, de
Onis et al, 2000, Galler and Barrett 2001, Glewwe et al. 2001, Shari¤ et al. 2000).
In most cases, children in poor households are more vulnerable to malnutrition,
compared to their counterparts in rich households. Health inequality has been a
great concern in developing countries in general and those in Sub-Saharan Africa
in particular. In general, socioeconomic health inequality often takes the form of
di¤erences in health outcomes such as malnutrition and incidences of diarrhea,
di¤erences in health services utilization or in utilization of benets received from
public expenditure on health services. Childhood malnutrition manifests either
in low weight for age z-scores (stunting), low height for age z-scores (wasting) or
in low weight for height z-scores. In Nigeria like in many other countries, one of











inequalities in health. International organizations such as the World Bank, World
Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and other international donors organiza-
tions are concerned with reducing health inequality across the globe, Wagsta¤
(2000). Several policy statements and papers by these organizations stress the
need to reduce variations in health status between countries and within socioeco-
nomic groups in every country (Pradhan, et al. 2003, de Onis and Habicht 1996
and de Onis et al. 2000).
The general belief is that the objective of closing the gap between the poor
and the better-o¤ is easily achievable under a democratically elected government
(Meltzer and Richard 1981, Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, Boix 2003, Bueno et
al. 2005, Deacon 2009)1 . However, recent studies propose that when elections are
not credible, political leaderspreferences might be at variance with the general
needs of the citizens (Polterovich and Popov 2005, Keefer 2004, Ross 2006, Got-
tlieb 2009). Many studies have attempted to compare inequality under democracy
with other forms of government, especially in developed countries, from both an
historical perspective and also based on more recent experiences (Nikoloski 2010,
Gradstein and Milanovic 2004). Most of these studies, however, concentrate on
one aspect of inequality, that is, income inequality while other aspects of inequality
such as health disparites are yet to be explored. However, nutritional well-being
and health equity are important fundamental human rights which are expected to
be better protected under democratic rule.
In this paper, we examine the extent of health inequality under military rule in
Nigeria and compare this with the subsequent ten years of transition to democratic
1These studies are based on credible, competitive elections in the advanced democracies unlike












rule in 1999. In addition, we seek to analyse the determinants of changes in health
inequalities in the country between the two periods. Growing interest in health in-
equality in recent times, as opposed to income inequality measures used in the past,
is due to limitations in research using the latter: Poverty which includes the depri-
vation of capabilities, or the failure of certain basic functioning, is not adequately
captured by either income or expenditure data as noted by Sen and Hawthorn
(1989) and Pradhan et al. (2003). Although incomes are indisputably signicant,
health is also an intrinsically important aspect of well-being (Sen 1980, Sen and
Hawthorn 1989, Sen 2003, Pradhan et al. 2003). Secondly, health inequality is a
non-metric measure without the problem of comparison over time and location.
Health inequality is therefore not subject to the challenge of deation. Thirdly,
the e¤ects of health inequality are detrimental to the human capital development
of children and to the future growth of the economy. Therefore if these are not
addressed in time, health inequality may result in the permanent incapability of
children, Deaton (2003). Lastly, health inequalities capture the e¤ects of varia-
tions in the distribution of public services which are not easily captured by any
measure of income inequality.
Furthermore, the general adage that "health is wealth" is instructive to our
focus on health in this paper. Healthier citizens are likely going to be more produc-
tive and contribute positively to economic development of the country, all things
being equal. In addition, good health also has a positive e¤ect on the learning
attitude and abilities of children and leads to better educational outcomes and in-
creases the e¢ ciency of human capital development by individuals, household and
the nation (Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Schultz, 1999). Illness reduces physical,











Therefore, the most important need of every citizen under either military or
democratic rule is health. However, children are the most vulnerable group in the
society. One of the most important functions of government is to protect the rights
of every child, especially health. When a childs health is guaranteed the future of
such a child and the country at large is protected. If citizens health, especially the
poor are not protected, all other activities of government in trying to provide for
the basic needs of the citizens will be unproductive. Since children cannot protect
themselves, their survival depends on both their parents and government in power
in the country. It is however assumed that democratic governments will be more
committed to policies aimed at improving citizens health and as well reduce health
inequality between the rich and the poor in the country.
For the reasons enumerated above, it is therefore necessary to give priority to
analysis and reduction of health inequality across nations and within socioeconomic
groups in a country. The contributions of this paper to this research eld are as
follows: As far as we know, this is the rst paper to compare health inequality
under two di¤erent forms of government in sub-Saharan Africa in general and in
Nigeria in particular. The second contribution of this paper is in our decomposition
of changes in inequalities between two periods using anthropometric measures as
our indicator of child health outcomes. This is an objective measure of child
health outcomes recently made possible by the availability of anthropometric data











4.0.10 Review of the Literature
There are two strands of argument in studies on the relationship between democ-
racy and inequality. The rst group of researchers proposing the existence of a
negative relationship between democracy and inequality argue that there is more
redistribution under democracy than under other forms of governments, such as
military rule. One of the most celebrated works on democracy and inequality is
the median voter model proposed by Meltzer and Richard (1981), in their work
"A rational theory of the size of government". The model is based on two assump-
tions. The rst assumption states that redistribution decisions are based on the
rational choice of utility maximising individuals, while the second states that the
link between market-generated inequality and redistribution is lower in autocracies
than in democracies. Analysis of the link between democracy and income inequal-
ity has attracted many economists in the past. Analysts argue that if inequality in
access to political participation is reduced through competitive elections, inequal-
ity in other areas of life will also be reduced. They further argue that democracy
redistributes political power in favour of the majority, and thereby enhances equal
distribution of socioeconomic benets (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990; and Lipset 1994).
According to Reuveny and Li (2003), redistribution policies under democratic
rule are designed in favour of the poorer and middle classes in society, which
will eventually lower the level of inequality. Drawing from Pommerehne and Frey
(1978), it can be stated that a non-democratic regime will not provide political
outcomes that are as close to the preferences of the median voters as a democratic
regime. Bollen and Jackman (1986) and Rodrik (1999), also, propose that greater











Commander and Nikoloski (2010), examined both the long term and short
term e¤ects of democracy on income inequality. They conclude that a reduction
in inequality is due to other factors such as availability of natural resources and
the sectorial composition of the economy, rather than to democracy. Critics of this
view, including Mulligan and Sala-i Martin (1999) and Benabou (1996), argue that
a reduction in inequality under di¤erent regimes is mainly determined by e¢ ciency
rather than politics. In addition, Chongs (2004), argues that democracy is not
good at protecting the poor, while Chong and Calderon (2000), propose that the
high transaction costs associated with institutional reforms under democracy may
increase inequality.
There are empirical works that examine the relationship between democracy
and inequality. Milanovic (1999) study shows that there has been an increase in
the redistribution of income in favour of the poorer classes under democratic rule.
Chong (2004) study however provides comprehensive empirical cross country evi-
dence on the relationship between democracy and income inequality in 51 countries
between 1960 and 1997. His conclusions show evidence of a lack of consensus on
whether inequality is reduced under democratic rule. For rich and highly equal
countries his result shows that income inequality is negatively related to democracy
but for poor and highly unequal countries democracy has positive e¤ects on income
inequality. His ndings are consistent with the studies of Justman and Gradstein
(1999), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005)
and Bourguignon and Verdier (2000)2.
In a review of 12 studies, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) concluded that political
2Although, these studies provide useful information on the macroeconomic e¤ect of democra-
cies, they do not account for micro e¤ects of democracy on the standard of livings of ordinary











democracy reduces inequality in general. In another survey of literature on the
relationship between democracy and inequality, Gradstein and Milanovic (2004)
further concluded, based on recent evidence, that democracy is inversely related
to income inequality. Gradstein, et al. (2001) examined the e¤ects of democracy
on inequality in 126 countries, between 1960 and 1998. Their result shows that
in Judeo-Christian societies, inequality is reduced with an increase in democra-
tizations while democracy had no signicant e¤ect on inequality in Muslim and
Confucian societies. They concluded that the e¤ect of democracy might therefore
depend on the societys ideology on inequality. Feld and Kirchgassner (2006), con-
siders the e¤ects of di¤erent forms of democracies on inequality. Their ndings
show that representative democracy is more e¤ective than direct democracy in
reducing inequality.
Bicego and Ahmad (1996), used DHS data from 20 developing countries to
analyses socioeconomics related health inequality, using mortality rates as their
measure of health outcomes. Their result shows that mortality of children under
5 years old born to women with secondary education was 50% lower than that of
those born to women with no education. In another study, Woelk and Chikuse
(2000), focused their study on inequalities in stunting, the number of underweight
children and the incidence of diarrhoea in Zimbabwe. From their study, they
concluded that children in poor households in the country are prone to being
underweight three times more than children in non-poor households. Hadad et al,
(1999), used DHS data for countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America to analyze
variations in the prevalence of stunting in rural and urban areas. Their results
show that levels of stunting were greater in urban areas than in rural areas. In











stunting in Africa, Asia and Latin America are larger in urban than in rural areas.
Wagsta¤ et al. (2003), decompose inequality in stunting in Vietnam, using
concentration indices for the years 1993 and 1998. Their ndings show that in-
equalities in consumption and commune-level e¤ect are the main causes of the
prevalence of stunting amongst lowest income quintile in the country. In addition,
they nd that both the increase in average consumption inequality and general
improvements at the commune level accounted for the change in stunting inequal-
ity between 1993 and 1998. William et al.(2009), argue that the distribution of
endowment and positive maternal characteristics accounted for the widening gap
in child malnutrition between poor and the non-poor households in India. Ellen
et al. (2009), used Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to decompose the di¤erences in
child malnutrition between Scheduled Castes and the remaining Indian population.
Their results show that inequality in stunting between the Scheduled Castes and
the remaining population was caused by inequalities in wealth, education and use
of health care services. In another study on health inequalities in 42 developing
countries, Wagsta¤ (2002), enumerated four approaches to a better understanding
of the impact of anti-inequality policies on health inequalities. These approaches
are: cross country comparative studies, before-and-after country based studies with
controls, benet-incidence analysis, and decomposition analysis. His results show
that health inequality has been rising in both developed and developing countries
in recent times.
All the studies above, with the exception of the research of Wagsta¤ et al.
(2003) focused on comparisons of income inequality under two regimes while some
examined health inequality at a point in time. We are not aware of any study which











Africa in general and particularly in Nigeria.
4.0.11 Research Questions
The questions we seek to answer in this paper are: (1) Does the health inequality
evident under military rule persists under democratic rule in Nigeria; (2) What
are the causes of and changes in health inequality in Nigeria over this period?
4.0.12 Denition, Methods and measurement of health in-
dicators
Various indicators to measure and analyze socioeconomic inequality in health out-
comes have been discussed in the literature. Some of these are infant mortality,
incidence of diseases such as diarrhoea, life expectancy, morbidity and the re-
cently anthropometric measures of underweight scores (low weights for age z-scores
(WAZ)) and stunting (low heights for age z-scores (HAZ)) of children. We are using
this last method which has been judged in the literature as the most objective mea-
sure of health outcomes especially as measures of child health (Kabubo-Mariara
et al.2009, WHO Anthro 2009, and Wagsta¤ 2002). This indicator is also suitable
for health comparisons across time and location. Data from the Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS) on Nigeria also enables us to have access to much needed
anthropometric measures of children in pre and post democratic transitions in the
country.
In this paper, we measure both WAZ and HAZ of children aged 0-36 months in
Nigeria in 1999 and 2008 respectively. The 1999 DHS contains information about












Map 6.2 Geographical pattern of stunting in children under age five on a country basis 
• 40.0% and higher 
o 30.0%- 39.9% 
o 20.0%-29.9% 
• Less than 20.0% 
o No data 










about children who were born under democratic rule. Thus we are able to carry out
a comparison of child health inequality under these two regimes. We focus on the
problem of stunting and being underweight, which we measure by using negative
weight-for-age z-scores and negative height-for-age z-scores of children between age
0-35 months. Negative z-scores convey important information on the severity of
stunting and being underweight rather than the probability of whether a child will
be stunted or underweight. We then multiply the negative z-scores by -1 for the
purpose of our analysis, following trends in the literature (ODonnell, et al. 2008,
Wagsta¤, et al. 2003, and Skouas 1998). Based on the WHO recommendation,
children with z-scores lower than -6 are excluded from our analysis method (Meng
et al. 2005, Goesling and Firebaugh 2004, Pradhan et al. 2003).
For us to be able to measure inequality in health outcomes between the rich
and poor under the two regimes, we rst use principal component analysis (PCA)
to measure householdsasset indices, due to the non-availability of income and
expenditure information in the DHS dataset. Recent studies show that asset in-
dices derived from PCA are good predictors of health outcomes as well as a good
alternative to income and expenditure data ( Sahn and Stifel 2003, Filmer and
Pritchett 2001). The asset index is also used here to group households into ve
asset quintiles, from the poorest group to the richest group.
4.0.13 Measurement of health inequality using the concen-
tration index
As earlier indicated, inequality in health between the poor and the rich may be











penditure or subsidies or in the form of inequality in health outcomes. The latter,
which is our main focus is the most comprehensive measure of health inequality.
We used concentration indices to determine whether inequality exists in stunting
and being underweight among children aged 0-36 months in Nigeria. This is the
rst step in our analysis of health inequality. The Concentration index is twice
the area between the concentration curve and the line of equality (ODonnell et
al; 2008). For instance, if yi is the negative of the height-for-age z-score of child i.
The concentration index (CI) of y results from a concentration curve, which plots
the cumulative proportion of children, ranked by socioeconomic status, against
the cumulative proportion of y. The concentration curve lies above the diagonal
if y is larger among the poorer children and vice versa. The further the curve lies
from the diagonal, the higher the socioeconomic inequality in nutritional status.
Therefore, a concentration index is a measure of this inequality and is dened as
twice the area between the concentration curve and the diagonal. If children with
low socioeconomic status su¤er more malnutrition than their better o¤ peers the
concentration index will be negative (Wagsta¤ et al 1991).In the illustrated graph
in Figure4.1 below, the 450 line is the line of equity between the poor and the rich.
The concentration index is equal to zero at any point along this line, meaning
that there is no inequality between the poor and the rich in the distribution of
the variable under consideration. If the curve lies above the line, the variable is
concentrated amongst the poor and the value of the index will be negative. On
the other hand, if the curve lies below the line, then the variable is concentrated
amongst the rich and the value of the concentration index in this case will be
positive. Households are ranked based on their socioeconomic status, and the











Figure 4.1: Graphical illustration of the concentration index
variable of interest is severe, the variable in our case being incidences of stunting
and being underweight. If stunting or being underweight is severe amongst the
poor, the index takes a negative value but if stunting and being underweight is
severe amongst the rich, the index value is positive. Because stunting and being
underweight are indicators of ill health, a negative value of the concentration index
means that ill health is severe or intense amongst the poor. If there is no inequality
in the health variable under consideration, the index will be equal to zero. If the
index is positive, then the variable under consideration is prevalent amongst the
rich. A comparison of the concentration index between the two regimes will show
whether inequality in ill health between the poor and the rich has been reduced
or become worse. Therefore, if government policies after transition from military
rule to democratic rule in Nigeria favour the poor, it is expected that inequality
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in stunting and being underweight will be lower under democratic rule. We used
the well known Kakwani, et al. (1997) method to compute inequality in stunting
and being underweight, in 1999, 2003 and 2008 respectively. The index is given as




where; C is the concentration index, which is a measure of relative inequality,
like the Gini coe¢ cient.  is the mean of y, y is the health variable. R is the
fractional rank of the ith person in the income distribution. Therefore, doubling
of the score for every individuals health does not a¤ect the concentration index
but rather leaves the index unchanged. The concentration index value is bounded
between -1 and 1.
4.0.14 Decomposition of changes in health inequality in
Nigeria
The next step in our analysis of health inequality in Nigeria is to nd a way of
explaining di¤erences in health outcomes between the poor and the rich in the
country. We used decomposition methods to explain di¤erences in the severity
of stunting and being underweight between the poor and the rich in the country.
The decomposition method enables us to show how inequality in the two health
outcomes can be explained by inequality in other factors that a¤ect stunting and
being underweight. Therefore, if inequality in other factors that a¤ect stunting
and being underweight are responsible for inequality in child health, then, it will
be easier to reduce inequality in stunting and being underweight by reducing in-
equality in their determinants. This is the main benet of decomposing health











Decomposition of the concentration index as proposed byWagsta¤et al. (2003)
in equation (2) to (3) explained inequality in stunting and being underweight across
the entire distribution of socioeconomic status. This method decomposed the con-
centration index of health outcome into the contributions of individual factors to
income-related health inequality. Accordingly, each of these contributions is de-
termined by both the elasticity and the income-related inequality in those factors.
Based on the work of Wagsta¤ et al. (2003), ODonnell et al. (2008) decomposed
height-for-Age z-score concentration indices of children in Vietnam for 1993 and
1998. Their work shows that the concentration index can be decomposed into the
contributions of individual variables to asset or income-related health inequality.
Assuming a reduced linear additive regression model of health, as proposed by
Wagsta¤ et al. (2003) to be,
(2) y = +
P
k k ^k +"i;
where y is the health outcome of interest and ^ is a vector of the determinants




k (k Zk = ) Ck +GC" =
where  is the mean of y , Zkis the mean of ^k, Ck is the concentration index
for ^k(dened analogously to C), and GC" is the generalized concentration index
for the error term (") dened as,
(4) GC" = 2n
P
"iRi;
Eq. (4) is equivalent to the Gini coe¢ cient corresponding to the generalized
Lorenz curve (Wagsta¤ et al; 2003).
Changes in health inequality over time can be decomposed into changes in











of changes in these factors to the overall change in inequality. There are two
approaches to decomposition of changes in inequality. The rst approach, which
is the most common calculates di¤erences by assuming that all the components of








kt 1 Zkt 1 = t 1

Ckt 1 +(GC"t =t)
However, (5) is not intuitive enough as it does not di¤erentiate between e¤ects
due to changes in the elasticities of the variables and the e¤ects due to changes in
the inequality of the variables. To overcome the weakness associated with (5), we
use an Oaxaca-type decomposition (Wagsta¤ et al. 2003; Oaxaca 1973; ODonnell
et al. 2008), to explain changes in health inequality subsequent to transition in
1999 to democratic rule in Nigeria. The Oaxaca-type decomposition of changes
in inequality of equation (3) di¤erentiates the e¤ects of changes in the variables
elasticities from the e¤ects of changes in the socioeconomic distribution of the
variables on the overall change in inequality in the specic health outcomes which
are stunting and being underweight in our case. Based on ODonnell et al. (2008)
and Wagsta¤ et al. (2003), the Oaxaca-type decomposition of change in equation
(3) is as follows:
(6) C =
P
k kt (Ckt   Ckt 1)+
P
k Ckt 1(kt   kt 1) + (GC"t =t)
where  represents change, kt stands for the elasticity of y with respect to
variable xk at time t, Ckt is the concentration index of variable xk at time t; while
the remaining part of the equation is as dened in (3). With the above method,
we can explain, for each variable, and for all the variables combined, the extent to
which changes in health inequalities are due to either changes in inequality in the











4.0.15 Measurement of other variables
We measured all our variables using the DHS datasets on Nigeria for 1999 and
2008. Age of the child was measured in months from 0-35 months old. We limit
our analysis to 36 months for easy comparison, because the 1999 survey only
measured children aged 0-35 months. We include Childs age square to account
for nonlinearity in the relationship between childs health outcomes and age in
months, as specied in the literature (Wagsta¤ et al. 2003, Glewwe, Gragnolati
and Zaman 2000). Other child related variables included are the gender and twin
variables to control for the e¤ect of multiple births, and the variable indicating
whether a child had a fever within the two weeks preceding the survey3. Household
variables included are the asset index4, a dummy for safe drinking water (piped
and borehole water), sanitation (access to ush toilets), weight and height of the
mother, Mothersand Fatherslevels of education, and number of children in the
household. We also control for the e¤ects of unobservable characteristics of the
six geopolitical zones by including regional xed e¤ects and a dummy specifying
if the individual lives in an urban or rural community. All these variables are
theoretically and empirically conrmed to relate to child health outcomes .
3Generally, multiple birth children are smaller in weight and height early in life compared to
children of single births, due to their sharing of breast milk that would have been available to a
single child. Diarrhea is omitted due to its correlation with access to safe drinking water.
4We understand that asset index may be endogenous and that our use of OLS may be in-
appropriate. The asset index may be endogenous if householdsacquisition of assets is a¤ected
by long term illness of children. The alternative is to use instrumental variables. But as noted
by Wagsta¤ et al, (2003), using instrumental variables will change the interpretation of the
concentration index being explained from actual health inequality which is our main interest.
Therefore, inclusion of either income or asset index is a pre-requisite for the decomposition and
interpretation of the concentration index. However, we followed the general alternative in the
literature by using the reduced form equations of health outcomes for our analysis which is a
means of reducing the problem of endogeneity(Wagsta¤ A. 2002). We however exclude asset











4.0.16 Presentation and analysis of results
Table 4.1: Percentage Distribution of Assets by Quintile for 1999 and 2008 in
Nigeria
1999 2008
Assets poorest poor middle rich richest poorest poor middle rich richest
Electricity 0.0 0.0 44.7 90.2 97.2 7.0 4.8 41.4 73.8 90.9
Radio 0.0 95.5 52.9 94.4 99.1 40.6 86.3 95.1 93.6 97.4
Tv 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.8 99.3 0.0 0.0 0.72 90 95.5
Fridge 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.5 79.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 3.32 69.8
Bike 23.4 44.2 32.2 23 23.8 11.4 99.8 33.6 22.1 31.3
Motor bike 0.0 4.5 47.1 15.8 43.6 5.4 8.5 67.8 47.8 50.3
Car 0.0 0.0 8.2 6.9 32.1 0.3 0.13 3.9 4.6 34.5
Sand oor 69.7 50.7 26.1 13.7 3.4 67.0 68.8 50.0 16.3 9.4
Cement oor 22.8 40.2 69.0 75.6 64.6 23.6 22.9 42.4 60.0 55.3
Carpet oor 0.4 0.8 1.2 7.9 29.4 2.8 1.5 4.4 21.6 30.0
Table 4.1 presents percentage distribution of assets across the ve quintiles
in the country in 1999 and 2008. The table shows that ownership of assets was
greatest among the richest quintiles while the poorest quintile was most deprived.
We present in table 4.2, summary statistics of stunting and being underweight by
quintile in 1999 and 2008 under military and democratic rule respectively. The
gures indicate that in the poorest quintile mean stunting and being underweight
was higher than in the richest quintiles.
While mean stunting in 1999 was 3.09 in the poorest quintile, it was only 2.51 in
the richest households. In 2008 however, there was a general reduction in stunting
across the quintiles. Mean stunting in the poorest and the richest quintiles is
reduced to 2.67 and 2.08 respectively although stunting was still prevalent in the
poorest households. The percentage reduction in stunting of children between 1999
and 2008 for the poorest and the richest quintiles was 13.6 and 17.1 respectively.











Table 4.2: Summary statistics of Stunting and Being Underweight of children in
Nigeria
MILITARY DEMOCRACY
Quintiles mean stunting standard deviation mean stunting standard deviation %
Poorest 3.09 1.58 2.67 1.6 -13.6
Poor 3.1 1.54 2.59 1.52 -16.5
Middle 2.85 1.61 2.47 1.48 -13.3
Rich 2.68 1.48 2.24 1.45 -16.4
Richest 2.51 1.52 2.08 1.45 -17.1
Quintiles mean underweight standard deviation mean underweight standard deviation %
Poorest 2.32 1.63 2.19 1.39 -5.6
Poor 2.06 1.43 2.05 1.41 -0.5
Middle 1.86 1.39 1.86 1.33 0
Rich 1.79 1.27 1.57 1.16 -12.3
Richest 1.67 1.37 1.39 1.13 -16.8
% is the percentage quintiless change in stunting and being underweight between 1999 and 2008 in Nigeria
those in the poorest households from transition in the country.
Graphical illustration in Figure4.2 also indicates that the rich are better o¤
under democratic rule in the country. In the case of being underweight as presented
in Table 4.1 and Figure4.3, in 1999, that is, when the country was under military
rule, the poorest and the poor quintiles had the highest mean underweight scores
of 2.32 and 2.06 respectively.
In the same year, mean underweight scores for the middle, rich and the richest
quintiles were 1.86, 1.76 and 1.67 respectively. In 2008, mean underweight scores
for children ages 0-35 months was reduced in all the quintiles, but the rich and the
richest beneted the most in this regard. Mean underweight scores for the rich and
the richest quintiles, was reduced by 12.3 and 16.8 respectively, compared to a 0.5
and 5.6 reduction in mean underweight scores for children in the poor and poorest
























poorest poor midd le rich richest 














poorest poor midd le rich richest 










2008 for the middle quintile. Our summary statistics in Table 4.1 clearly show
that the problem of stunting and being underweight are severe amongst the poor
in 1999 and in 2008.
The use of a concentration index is more appropriate for a better understanding
of socioeconomic health inequality between two periods. In this section we present
our analysis and comparison of health inequality for children below the age of
36 months in Nigeria for the years 1999 and 2008. As earlier explained, when the
value of the concentration index is positive, stunting or being underweight is severe
or prevalent amongst the rich but when it is negative it is more severe amongst
the poor. Note also that the value of the index lies between 1 and -1.The closer
the concentration index is to zero, the lower the inequality in the variable under
consideration. Understanding this relationship is crucial to an understanding of
our analysis of health inequality as presented in the rest of this paper.
Table 4.3: Concentration Indices of Stunting and Being Underweight of children
in Nigeria
Measures of Health outcomes 1999 2008 Change between 1999 and 2008
Military rule Democratic rule %
Stunting Concentration indices -0.044 -0.050 13.6
(0.008) (0.004))
Underweight Concentration indices -0.067 -0.081 20.9
(0.011) (0.004)
Note: standard errors are in parentheses
There was considerable variation in the prevalence and changes in the two
measures of malnutrition among children in Nigeria. From our analysis of the
concentration index shown in table 4.3, childhood malnutrition in the country was
disproportionately concentrated amongst children living in poor households in 1999











from -0.044 in 1999 to -0.050 in 2008. The results indicate that children in poor
households were worse-o¤ in the rst ten years of democratic rule in the country.
Inequality in children being underweight rose by 20.9 percent or from -0.067 in
1999 to a peak of -0.081 in 2008. Our two measures of malnutrition show that
the gap between rich and poor still persists in the country, as indicated by the
increase in the severity of childhood malnutrition amongst the poor households.
However, we cannot fully explain the causes of the rise in inequalities in stunting
and being underweight without a decomposition of the concentration indices into
the determinants of health inequality. Therefore, the next step in our analysis is
to decompose each index into the contribution of inequality in the distribution of
the determinants of stunting and being underweight between the two periods.
4.0.17 Changes in variables determining health inequali-
ties between 1999 and 2008
We present, in table 4.4, the mean, concentration indices and change in the
indices between 1999 and 2008 for children below 36 months in Nigeria. There are
three columns for each year, which are the mean, the concentration index (CI) of
each variable and the standard error of the concentration index (std). When the
concentration index (measure of inequality) of a variable is positive, such variable
is advantageous to rich people if it is a good outcome, such as a health subsidy. On
the other hand, when the concentration index of a variable such as infant mortality
is positive, infant mortality is disadvantageous to the rich compared to the poor.
The value of the concentration index is bounded between a minimum of -1 and











(zero). The closer the concentration index of a given variable is to -1 the more
that variable is prevalent amongst the poor.
Our results for the two years under consideration show that the concentration
indices (CI) of most of the variables are positive, which indicates that the distrib-
ution of these variables is advantageous to the rich group. The incidence of fever,
as expected was concentrated in the poor households, as indicated by the negative
sign of CI. In 1999, when Nigeria was under military rule, ownership of assets
favoured the rich, with a CI of 0.256 point. Inequality in asset indices increased
to 0.276 in favour of the rich by 2008. The food consumption index was also con-
centrated among the rich in the two years of our analysis. It should be noted that
there was a signicant increase in food index inequality to the advantage of the
rich, from 0.016 in 1999 to 0.071 in 2008. This is an indication that the gap in
food security between the poor and the rich had widened, to the disadvantage of
the poor.
Access to safe drinking water and sanitation was also more prevalent among
the rich, with inequality in access to sanitation nearly doubling between 1999 and
2008 to the detriment of the poor. There was no signicant inequality in breast
feeding between the rich and the poor, since every child have access to being breast
fed except if the child is an orphan. Inequality in maternal and paternal education
consistently disfavoured the poor and inequalities over the years widened. While
inequality in motherseducation rose from 0.283 in 1999 to a peak of 0.311 in 2008,











Table 4.4: Selected Variables Mean and Concentration indices
1999 2008
Variables mean CI std mean CI std CI
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Age in months 16.26 0.032 0.008 16.025 0.014 0.003 -0.018
Age squared 362.54 0.054 0.013 356.79 0.024 0.004 -0.03
Child=male 0.508 0.003 0.014 0.503 0.002 0.006 -0.001
Twin dummy 0.049 0.06 0.083 0.041 0.053 0.033 -0.007
Asset index 2.934 0.256 0.004 2.88 0.276 0.002 0.02
Food index 0.752 0.018 0.026 2.20 0.071 0.006 0.053
safe Water 0.367 0.277 0.018 0.354 0.276 0.008 -0.001
Sanitation 0.737 0.085 0.009 0.637 0.134 0.005 0.049
Breast feeding 0.912 0.003 0.004 0.974 0.000 0.000 -0.003
Maternal education 0.846 0.282 0.013 0.840 0.31 0.006 0.028
Maternal height 155.6 -0.000 0.002 158.5 0.002 0.000 0.002
Urban 0.295 0.375 0.019 0.269 0.457 0.008 0.082
Number of children 2.158 -0.013 0.008 2.285 -0.009 0.003 0.004
Head age 40.86 0.008 0.005 40.48 -0.004 0.002 -0.012
Hage^2 1823.1 0.015 0.010 1793.4 -0.013 0.004 -0.028
Paternal education 1.1 0.221 0.011 1.07 0.258 0.005 0.037
Fever 0.311 -0.056 0.021 0.176 -0.035 0.012 -0.021
Maternal weight 57.81 0.022 0.004 58.73 0.029 0.002 0.007
Note: and  represent concentration indicies and the standard errors of the











4.0.18 Decomposing Changes in Inequalities in Stunting
and being Underweight
Inequality in being stunted and being underweight changed from one period to
another. As shown in table 4.3, we note that there were changes in both inequalities
in being stunted and being underweight between 1999 and 2008. Inequality in
being stunted rose from -0.044 in 1999 to -0.050 in 2008. On the other hand,
inequality in being underweight changed from -0.067 in 1999 to -0.083 in 2008.
These changes, which are disadvantageous to the poor households, are due to
changes in the determinants of a child being underweight and being stunted. We
therefore decomposed these changes for a better understanding of the contribution
of change in each variable to total change in health inequality. The results of the
decomposition are shown in Table 4.5 and 4.6 respectively.
We divide the e¤ect of change in each variable into change in the inequality
(concentration index) of each variable, weighted by the elasticity of the variable
(C) and the change in the elasticity of each variable, weighted by the concentra-
tion index of the variable (C) . Summation of these two e¤ects is the total e¤ect
of change in the variable on the total change (T) in inequality in being stunted
and being underweight. A negative sign of the change in any of the variables in
column 1 and 3 indicates that change in such variable between 1999 and 2008 has
been disadvantageous to the poor households. The last column in table 4.5 and 4.6
represent the e¤ect of total change in each variable on the total change in inequal-
ities in stunting and being underweight between 1999 and 2008. We shall focus
our analysis on the rst (C) and second (%C
TC
) columns which present how











ing stunted. In table 4.5, changes in most of the variables between 1999 and 2008
disadvantaged the poor, as shown by the negative signs of the coe¢ cient of these
variables. Changes in inequality in asset indices accounted for about -0.00092 or
16.5 percent of the increase in inequality in being stunted between 1999 and 2008.
The food consumption index contributed -0.000115 or 2.1 percent while change
in inequality in sanitation contributed -0.000237 or 4.3 percent of the increase in
inequality in being stunted. Di¤erences in access to drinking water marginally
reduced inequality in being stunted by -0.1 percent. Changes in inequality in ma-
ternal and paternal levels of education contributed -0.0007447 or 13.4 percent and
-0.000739 or 13.3 percent respectively, to increase inequality in being stunted be-
tween 1999 and 2008 to the disadvantage of children in poor households. Children
of malnourished mothers are shown to be more disadvantaged between 1999 and
2008, related to an increase in inequality in mothersheight, which further increase
inequality in being stunted by -0.001945 or 35 percent of the total increase in the
incidence of stunting amongst children in poor households. The combination of
the e¤ect of changes in the concentration indices of the determinants in column 1
and the changes in the elasticities of these variables nally resulted in an increase
of -0.005569 or 13.9 percent in inequality in stunting between 1999 and 2008. This
result conrmed the worsening conditions of the poor in the rst ten years un-
der democratic rule in Nigeria and the ndings stress the need for democratically
elected leaders to be more committed to the welfare of their citizens, especially
the poor.
Changes in the inequality in the food consumption index contributed to the
observed prevalence of stunting in poor households. As noted earlier, inequality in

















(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Age in months -0.00742 133.2 0.005825 -0.0016
Age squared 0.005189 -93.3 -0.00509 0.000101
Child=male -0.00004 0.7 0.00006 0.00001
Twin dummy -0.00002 00.4 -0.00023 -0.00025
Asset index -0.00092 16.5 0.016957 0.016038
Food index -0.000115 2.1 2.75E-05 -8.8E-05
Safe water 3.93004E-06 -0.1 -0.00629 -0.00628
Sanitation -0.000237 4.3 -0.00481 -0.00504
Breast Feeding 0.000283 -5.1 -0.00027 -8.8E-06
Maternal education -0.0007447 13.4 0.001552 0.000807
Maternal height -0.001945 35.0 5.89E-05 -0.00189
Urban -0.000633 11.4 -0.00969 -0.01033
Number of children -3.33661E-05 0.6 0.000588 0.000555
Head age -0.001215 21.8 0.002028 0.000812
Hage^2 0.001714 -30.8 -0.00126 0.000455
Paternal education -0.000739 13.3 0.011633 0.010894
Fever -2.42711E-05 0.4 -7.2E-05 -9.6E-05
Regional xed e¤ects -0.0003086 5.5 0.007157 0.006849
Residual 0.005394
Total -0.00721252 129.5 0.018177 -0.005569
Note: denotes change in the concentration index weighted by the
elasticity of the index,  is the change in the elasticity of each
variable weighted by the concentration index, while denotes











to the disadvantage of the poor households. The e¤ect of the increase in inequality
in the food consumption index on inequality in being stunted was however marginal
due to the age of the children included in our analysis who may be depending on
breast feeding rather than the alternative of food suplements. Changes in access
to drinking water and sanitation increased inequality in being stunted by -0.00628
and -0.00504 or about 14.3 and 11.5 percent of the level of inequality in stunting in
1999. This result conrmed the importance of equal access to basic services such
as safe water and sanitation.
Table 4.6 presents the ndings that, inequality in being underweight increased
by 20.9 percent that is, from -0.067 in 1999 to -0.081 in 2008, to the disadvantage
of poor households. The result of our decomposition of change in being under-
weight was similar to our explanation on the chang in being stunted. Most of
the policy related variables including the asset index, food consumption index,
and access to sanitation and water contributed to the increase in childrens be-
ing underweight between 1999 and 2008 to the disadvantage of children in poor
households. Surprisingly, changes in inequality in the food index as a percentage
of the total change in inequality in being underweight was the highest, at -0.0014
or 10.3 percent. We observe, also, that the e¤ect of change in age in months was
almost o¤set by the e¤ect of change in age squared. Two issues require further
analysis in the result of our decomposition above. In the rst place, although our
decomposition of inequality using a concentration index is revealing, the inclusion
of an asset index may lead to the problem of endogeneity bias if malnutrition
a¤ect household acquisition of assets. Since the inclusion of an asset index is a
pre-requisite to our analysis and we are not sure whether incidence of malnutrition

















(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Age in months -0.00377 27.7 0.011783 0.008009
Age squared 0.003673 -27.0 -0.00971 -0.00604
Child=male 0.000282 -2.1 -0.00015 0.000133
Twin dummy -0.0005 3.7 -1.13E-05 -0.00049
Asset index -0.0007 5.2 -0.0016 -0.0023
food index -0.0014 10.3 -0.00134 -0.00274
Safe water -0.00011 0.8 0.009377 0.009264
Sanitation -0.00126 9.3 0.001757 0.00499
Breast feeding -0.00056 4.1 -0.00026 -0.00082
Maternal education -0.00095 7.0 -0.01366 -0.01462
Maternal Weight -0.00077 5.7 0.003055 0.002283
Urban -7.8E-05 0.6 -0.01354 -0.01362
Number of children 3.74E-05 -0.3 -0.00035 -0.00031
Head age -0.00057 4.2 -0.00758 -0.00814
Headage^2 0.001558 -11.5 0.005721 0.007279
Paternal education -0.00055 4.0 -0.00107 -0.00162
Fever 0.000203 -1.5 0.000384 0.000587
Regional xed e¤ects -0.00125 9.2 0.026081 0.024835
Residual -0.0114
Total -0.00672 49.4 0.008904 -0.01359
Note: denotes change in the concentration index weighted by the
elasticity of the index,  is the change in the elasticity of each
variable weighted by the concentration index,while denotes











analyses using group di¤erences of malnutrition, which is devoid of the possible
bias of endogeneity (Wagsta¤,2002 and William et al.2009)5, and more appropriate
for policy intervention recommendations. In addition, the result of our decompo-
sition of changes in health inequality suggest that there may be regional variation
in the incidence and change in health inequality in the country.
4.0.19 Regional dimension of health inequality in Nigeria
We noticed from our decomposition of the concentration index that there may be
signicant regional variation in the changes reected in our two measures of health
inequality in the country. Therefore, it is necessary to explore this possibility
through further analysis of the six geopolitical zones in the country. The six
regions vary in terms of pre-colonial traditions, post colonial political ideologies,
religion and in natural resources endownment.
As shown in Table 4.7, inequality in stunting is concentrated amongst poor
households both in 1999 and 2008 in the North Central (NC) geopolitical zone.
Inequality in stunting in the NC region increased by 66.7 percent from -0.03 in
1999 under military rule to -0.05 under democratic rule, in 2008. In the same
NC geopolitical zone, socioeconomic inequality in being underweight rose by 250
percent in poor households from -0.02 in 1999 to -0.07 in 2008. Therefore, the
poor are worse-o¤ in the NC zone after 9 years of democratic rule in the country.
Stunting was concentrated in poor households under military rule in the North East
(NE) geopolitical zone in 1999, however, there was an increase in the prevalence of
5Oaxaca-blinder decomposition of group di¤erences in malnutrition does not require the inclu-
sion of income related variable such as asset index and consumption expenditure. The inclusion
of income related variables in the decomposition of the concentration index is the main possible











Table 4.7: Concentration Indices of Stunting and Being Underweight by regions
in Nigeria
stunting inequality underweight inequality
1999 2008 1999 2008
Regions military rule democratic rule % Military rule Democratic rule %
Pooled CI -0.044 -0.05 13.6 -0.067 -0.081 20.9
(0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
North central CI -0.03 -0.05 66.7 -0.02 -0.07 250
(0.018) (0.008) (0.026) (0.01)
North east CI -0.01 -0.02 100 -0.04 -0.02 -50
(0.013) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007)
North west CI -0.05 -0.02 -60 -0.03 -0.05 66.7
(0.02) (0.006) (0.024) (0.006)
South east CI -0.01 -0.04 300 0.05 -0.05 200
(0.032) (0.015) (0.045) (0.017)
South south CI 0.02 -0.02 200 0.00 -0.05 5
(0.021) (0.01) (0.035) (0.014)
South west CI -0.08 -0.03 -62.5 -0.05 -0.07 40
(0.020) (0.01) (0.026) (0.01)
% is the percentage change in inequality while the standard errors











stunting between 1999 and 2008 which disadvantaged poor households. Between
1999 and 2008, incidence of stunting was 100 percent higher in the poor households
than in rich households. In addition, incidence of being underweight was 250
percent higher in the poor households in 2008 than rich households in comparison
with 1999 gures. The situation in the North West (NW ) geopolitical zone was
mixed for the poor. While inequality in the concentration of stunting was reduced
by 60 percent between 1999 and 2008, to the advantage of the poor, inequality
in the concentration of being underweight was higher among the poor by 66.7
percent from -0.03 in 1999 to -0.05 in 2008. It is very important to emphasise that
both measures of malnutrition are still concentrated amongst poor households in
the NW zone in 2008. In the South East (SE) geopolitical zone, inequality in the
distribution of stunting and being underweight rose by 300 percent and 200 percent
respectively between 1999 and 2008, to the disadvantage of poor households. In
the South South (SS) geopolitical zone, the concentration of stunting in poor
households increased by 200 percent between 1999 and 2008, while inequality in
the incidence of being underweight rose by 5 percent, to the disadvantage of poor
children. Lastly, in the South West (SW ) geopolitical zone, inequality in the
concentration of stunting for poor households declined by 62.5 percent from, -0.08
in 1999 to -0.03 in 2008, but inequality in the incidence of being underweight
rose by 40 percent, from -0.05 in 199 to -0.07 in 2008, to the disadvantage of poor
children. As at 2008, inequalities in stunting and being underweight were therefore,
concentrated in poor households in all six geopolitical zones in the country. While
inequality in stunting to the disadvantage of poor children was highest in the North
Central zone in 2008, the highest inequality in being underweight was jointly shared











4.0.20 Blinder-Oaxaca Analysis of Group Di¤erences in
Malnutrition
As shown in table 4.8, we use Blinder-Oaxaca group mean di¤erences in stunting
and being underweight to check the robustness of our concentration indices. The
mean di¤erences between poor and non-poor children conrmed the persistency
and severity of malnutrition subsequent to transition to democratic rule in Nige-
ria. In addition, the Blinder-Oaxaca group mean di¤ereces in stunting and being
underweight show that there was a signicant increase in inequality between poor
and non-poor children at the one percent level. Similar to the change in the con-
centration indices, we observed that there was a slight but signicant increase in
inequality in stunting, from 0.422 to 0.424, between 1999 and 2008. On the other
hand, inequality in being underweight was very large and signicant at the one
percent level, from 0.363 to 0.540 between 1999 and 2008.
Table 4.8: Blinder-Oaxaca group di¤erences inStunting and Being Underweight
Measures of Health outcomes 1999 2008
Military rule Democratic rule
Blinder-Oaxaca inequality in stunting 0.422*** 0.424***
(0.083) (0.033)
Blinder-Oaxaca inequality in being underweight 0.363*** 0.540***
(0.073) (0.026)
Note: standard errors of inequality are in parentheses
and *** indicates signicant at 1 percent level
In the following analysis, as shown in table 4.9, we use Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
position to explain inequality due to di¤erences in the magnitudes of the deter-
minants (otherwise known as endownment e¤ect) of health outcomes and those











With this method we are able to decompose inequality in malnutrition without
the inclusion of an asset index and we are able to explain the relationship between
malnutrition and each determinant. An additional advantage of this method is
that we are able to adjust for possible selection bias that may arise from group-
ing households into a poor or non-poor groups. A negative sign of the variable
indicates that the gap in the distribution of malnutrition between poor and non-
poor children is narrowing, while a positive sign indicates increasing inequality in
malnutrition levels between poor and non-poor children. The result of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition of group di¤erences in stunting shows that the endowment
e¤ect between poor and non-poor contributed a total of 0.275 or 64.9 percent of
the total gap in stunting between poor and non-poor children in 2008. The endow-
ment e¤ects total contribution to inequality in stunting is signicant at the one
percent level to the disadvantage of poor children, as shown in Table 4.9. Column
(ii) in Table 4.9, shows that characteristics of children such as gender and being a
twin both inuence the levels of inequality in stunting.
Inequalities in access to safe drinking water, maternal education levels and
mothers height, also determine di¤erences in stuntingg between poor and non-poor
children. Regional xed e¤ects also play a role in unequal levels of malnutrition
between rich and poor children. It should be noted that the contribution of these
variables to the recorded di¤erences conrms our earlier analysis of inequality in
stunting using concentration indices. While unequal access to safe drinking water
was signicant at the ve percent level, di¤erences in maternal education levels
was signicant at the one percent level. Unequal access to sanitation, however,
favour the poor because most buildings with water closet (WC) toilets lack the











Table 4.9: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of inequality in stunting in Nigeria, 2008
VARIABLES Endowments e¤ect Coe¢ cients e¤ect Interaction e¤ect
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Age in months -0.0333** (0.013) 0.575** (0.263) -0.0267* (0.0140)
Age^2 0.0300** (0.013) -0.172 (0.165) 0.0144 (0.0142)
Child-male -0.00132 (0.0025) -0.0330 (0.033) 0.000372 (0.0008)
Twin dummy -0.00297* (0.0018) -0.00697 (0.0066) 0.00171 (0.0018)
Food index 0.00233 (0.0067) 0.00427 (0.0426) -0.000883 (0.0088)
Safe water 0.0481** (0.0188) 0.102** (0.0411) -0.0629** (0.0253)
Sanitation -0.0361* (0.0187) -0.0578 (0.063) 0.0202 (0.0219)
Breast feeding -1.86e-05 (0.00046) -0.205 (0.244) -2.43e-05 (0.0006)
Maternal ducation 0.127*** (0.0295) -0.0894 (0.0657) 0.0575 (0.0422)
Maternal height 0.0200*** (0.0048) 0.872 (0.638) -0.00629 (0.0047)
Urban 0.0363 (0.0235) -0.0248 (0.0460) 0.0201 (0.037)
Number of children 0.00197 (0.0025) -0.0685 (0.063) -0.00325 (0.0031)
Headage 6.89e-06 (0.0073) 0.190 (0.531) 0.00305 (0.0086)
Headage^2 -0.00240 (0.0107) -0.0789 (0.232) -0.00421 (0.0124)
Paternal education 0.0423 (0.0289) -0.0136 (0.068) 0.00759 (0.0382)
Regional xed e¤ect 0.0470*** (0.0148) -0.108 (0.077) 0.0286 (0.0206)
Fever -0.00365 (0.0023) 0.0220 (0.014) 0.00405 (0.0028)
Total 0.275*** (0.0397) 0.0954* (0.0521) 0.0532 (0.0570)
Constant -0.812 (0.733)
Observations 8,955 8,955 8,955











regular water supply in the country, houses with these toilets pose a greater danger
to the health of children.
The total contribution of coe¢ cient e¤ects (e¤ects of the determinants) to total
inequality in stunting between the poor and non-poor was 0.0954 or 22.5 percent
in 2008 (shown in column (iii)). Most of the variables are not signicant at the
individual level but unequal access to safe drinking water contributed signicantly
to unequal levels of malnutrition. Even the interaction of the contribution of en-
dowment and coe¢ cient e¤ects of access to safe drinking water widened inequality
in stunting between poor and non-poor children by 2008. Therefore, our results
further stress the importance of focus on these policy related variables in order to
narrow the gap between rich and poor households in the incidence of stunting in
the country.
The results of the decomposition of group di¤erences in being underweight,
shown in Table 4.10 were similar to ndings with regard to stunting. Column (ii),
shows that endownment e¤ects contributed signicantly to inequality in being un-
derweight, at 0.231 or 42.8 percent of the total inequality in being underweight
between poor and non-poor children in the country. At individual variable level,
the contribution of di¤erences in food consumption was positive and now signi-
cant, at the10 percent level, while the inuence of di¤erences in maternal education
and mothers weight, and regional xed e¤ects are all positive and signicant, at
1 percent level. The number of children in the household contributed signicantly
to widening the gap between children from rich and poor households with regard
to being underweight and this is signicant at the 5 percent level. The total coef-
cient e¤ect was not signicant, although some of the variables are signicant at











Table 4.10: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of inequality in being underweight in
Nigeria, 2008
Variables Endowments e¤ect Coe¢ cients e¤ect Interaction e¤ect
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Age in months -0.00427 (0.0056) 1.381*** (0.203) -0.0480*** (0.0179)
Age^2 0.00402 (0.0060) -0.734*** (0.125) 0.0449*** (0.0158)
Child male 0.000197 (0.0014) 0.0406 (0.026) 0.000118 (0.0008)
Twin dummy -0.00316** (0.0016) 0.00106 (0.0054) -0.000350 (0.0018)
Food index 0.00882* (0.0054) -0.0969*** (0.033) 0.0210*** (0.0074)
Safe water 0.00599 (0.014) 0.0430 (0.033) -0.0258 (0.0196)
Sanitation -0.0342** (0.015) -0.105** (0.052) 0.0352** (0.0173)
Breast dummy 0.00130 (0.0013) -0.340* (0.20) -0.000986 (0.0011)
Maternal edulevel 0.125*** (0.023) -0.275*** (0.053) 0.187*** (0.036)
Maternal weight 0.0366*** (0.0073) 0.148 (0.091) -0.0145 (0.0089)
Urban 0.00697 (0.018) -0.0548 (0.038) 0.0445 (0.0307)
Children number 0.00588** (0.0023) -0.124** (0.051) -0.00509** (0.0025)
Headage 0.000604 (0.0023) -0.508 (0.413) -0.000851 (0.0033)
Headage2 -0.00302 (0.0036) 0.141 (0.180) 0.00261 (0.0039)
Paternal edulevel 0.0294 (0.023) -0.161*** (0.054) 0.0963*** (0.032)
Regional xed e¤ect 0.0490*** (0.012) 0.111* (0.064) -0.0294* (0.017)
Fever 0.00143 (0.0012) 0.0134 (0.012) 0.00149 (0.0014)
Total 0.231*** (0.031) 0.000974 (0.043) 0.308*** (0.047)
Constant 0.520 (0.324)
Observations 10,016 10,016 10,016











in being underweight. On the other hand, the interaction between the di¤erences
in the endowment and coe¢ cient e¤ects contributed signicantly to inequalities in
being underweight. The total contribution was 0.308, or 50 percent of the total
inequality in being underweight and was signicant at the 1 percent level. Some
of the variables that contribute positively and signicantly to inequality in being
underweight when interaction e¤ects are taken into account include unequal ac-
cess to sanitation, food, and di¤erences in maternal and paternal education levels.
Interaction e¤ect of unequal access to water and regional xed e¤ects are widens
the gap in inequality in being underweight.
4.0.21 Summary, policy implications and conclusion
In this paper we have considered the problem of childhood health inequality in
Nigeria between 1999 and 2008, in particular, we investigate the problem of child-
hood malnutrition. Our main aim has been to present empirical evidence on
whether health inequality between poor and non-poor children has declined after
transition to democratic rule in the country in 1999. Secondly, we also seek to
identify the main determinants of health inequality in the country and the e¤ects
of changes in these determinants on the change in inequality in childhood malnu-
trition between 1999 and 2008. From our ndings, we establish that inequality
in stunting and being underweight has persisted and worsened under democratic
rule in the country. Inequality in being stunted rose by 13.6 percent between 1999
and 2008, and inequality in being underweight increased by 20.9 percent within
the same period, to the disadvantage of poor children. We show strong evidence











scriptive analysis and our regression analysis. Our decompositions show that the
main causes of inequality in the two health outcomes of interest are due to dif-
ferences in maternal and paternal levels of education, and unequal access to safe
drinking water and sanitation. Household location was also a major factor in un-
equal childrenhood malnutrition outcomes. We argue that this may be due to lack
of access to basic services such as safe drinking water and sanitation and health
care services, in rural areas. We also show that socioeconomic di¤erences in the
determinants of health inequality rather than their elasticities are the main causes
of the increase in health inequality subsequent to the transition to democratic rule
in the country.
Policy implications of our ndings are that: (i) mere transition from military
rule to democratic rule, without concerted e¤orts to reduce existing health inequal-
ity may worsen the health situation for the poor, (ii) the democratic government
in Nigeria should concentrate on reducing inequality in access to education in or-
der to reduce health inequality in the country, (iii) reducing regional variations in
health inequality in the country should be given high priority by the various tiers
of government (iv) equitable provision of basic services such as access to safe drink-
ing water and sanitation, must be a priority if the government wishes to reduce
existing health disparities.
In conclusion, it may be interesting for future research to focus on ethnic di-
mensions of health inequality in the country, as well as on analysis of the inuence















To date, competitive democracy remains the most attractive and acceptable form
of government across the globe. Therefore, most previous autocratic governments
are either now democratic or are in the process of democratization. Pressure from
the international community and fear of isolation have contributed to ensuring
democracy has become the most popular form of government. In line with general
trends, many African countries, including Nigeria, have also made a transition from
autocratic rule to relatively democratic governments. However, recent literature
focuses on how benecial the change in government has been for ordinary citizens
in term of provision of public goods and improvement in the general well-being
of the electorate. This concern emanates from the non-competitive nature of the
democratic process in developing countries, as well as the problem of political
capture, which is a result of weak electoral competition. This thesis focuses on











under political transition. The three issues of concern are as follows:
1. To establish the relationship between political power competition and
public expenditure on welfare related public goods and on householdsaccess to
safe drinking water in Nigeria. Considering the problem of weak electoral competi-
tion in the country and political capture by special interest groups, we question the
generalization that transition from autocratic rule to democratic rule will improve
the welfare of citizens.
2. Due to the lack of of piped water, most households resort to drinking
alternative sources of water with little or no consideration for the health implica-
tions of these sources of water. What actually is the e¤ect of di¤erent sources of
water and sanitation on the health outcomes of children in the country, who are
the most vulnerable of the countrys inhabitants? This is the focus of our second
research issue.
3. Based on median voterstheory, inequality should be reduced subsequent
to transition from autocratic rule to democratic rule. Previous studies focused on
one aspect of inequality, which is income inequality, while health inequality studies
have not been undertaken in the past due to the lack of anthropometric measures.
However due to the importance of healthy living for childrens survival and for
human capital development, we ll this gap in the literature by considering the
issue of changes in health inequality during political transition in Nigeria.
Answers to the above questions are provided in chapters 2 to 4. In chapter 2,
the rst issue is addressed while the second issue is investigated in chapter 3. The
last issue is analyzed in chapter 4 while a summary of the ndings of the three











5.0.23 Summary of ndings
Chapter 2 of this study investigates the relationship between political competition
and the allocation of public expenditure on health and welfare related basic ser-
vices. It applies the recently developed Bounds testing approach to cointegration
(ARDL method) to establish a long run relationship between polity2 (measure
of political power competition) and public expenditure of interest between 1960
and 2008. The results show that political competition is positive and signicantly
related to public expenditure on health and welfare related basic services, despite
the problem of weak electoral competition and special interest group capture in the
country. On the other hand, political competition has no signicant relationship
to capital expenditure, from our analysis. This is an indication that politicians
are less committed to the development of infrastructure in the country.
At the micro level, the chapter uses dynamic panel analysis to investigate
the e¤ect of political competition at the sub-national level on the provision of safe
drinking water. The results show that political competition is negatively related to
access to safe drinking water in the country between 1999 and 2008. This indicates
that while public expenditure on basic services may increase under weak electoral
competition, actual provision of basic services may be poorer in the presence of
corruption and interest group capture, as in the case of Nigeria. Corruption,
bitter rivalry and political capture encourage leakages in the economy which may
be responsible for the lack of maintenance of dams and pipes constructed under
the military rule by politicians subsequent to the change in government.
In chapter 3, the e¤ect of access to di¤erent sources of drinking water on the











safe drinking water into focus. The chapter shows that drinking of well water in
particular is harmful to the health of children in the country. It also shows that
access to improved sanitation enhances proper growth of children in the country.
To be able to accomplish the objective of this chapter, height z-scores and weight
z-scores of children aged 0-59 months were constructed for the analysis of the
DHS dataset of 2008 in Nigeria. The results show that children who drink well
water grow slower than children who drink piped and borehole water. In addition,
children in households with improved sanitation (ush toilets) grow faster than
children in households with pit latrines or no toilet facility. Drinking of well water
by children signicantly increases their probability of being stunted and being
underweight, as shown in the results of the analysis in chapter 3. This is the
reason why provision of safe drinking water should be given high priority in the
country.
Chapter 4 considered changes in health inequality between 1999 during the
military regime and 2008 under democratic rule to test the hypothesis on the re-
lationship between inequality and transition to democratic rule. The chapter used
the DHS data of 1999 and 2008 under military and democratic rule respectively
to evaluate the standard of living of children in poor households in comparison
to children in rich households for the two periods. Based on Kakwani concentra-
tion index, the analysis shows that inequality in stunting and being underweight
increased between 1999 and 2008 among children ages 0-36 months in the coun-
try. In addition, inequality in access to safe drinking water, food consumption,
access to sanitation, parents educational levels and wealth increased during the
period under consideration. The results also indicate that the severity of increase











increase in health inequalities between the two periods was contributed to by in-
equalities in basic services such as water, sanitation, food consumption and parents
educational level based on the decomposition of changes in inequality. Children in
poor households are disproportionately disadvantaged in all the measures of health
inequality used for our analysis. The result is similar to our ndings in chapter 2
on the provision of safe drinking water. This later nding further conrms that
transition from a military regime to democratic rule may be worse for the poor,
especially when elections are not credible and corruption is endemic such as in the
case of Nigeria.
5.0.24 Policy implications of the thesis ndings
This thesis focused on the welfare implications of transition from a military regime
to democratically elected government in the presence of weak electoral competition
and interest group capture. While the thesis conrmed that political power compe-
tition encourages an increase in the allocation of public expenditure to health and
welfare services, it however shows that such an increase in public expenditure may
not necessarily lead to an increase in the actual provision of public goods. There-
fore, for citizens to enjoy better provision of public goods under democratic rule,
the electoral process must be credible so that politicians can be held accountable
for their performance in o¢ ce during future elections.
When elections are not credible, the welfare of the ordinary citizens may su¤er
under democratic rule. It is therefore misleading to assume that the poor are
better o¤ once leaders are elected, especially in the developing countries where











performance subsequent to changes in political power should be based on actual
provision of public goods instead of the normal reliance on allocation of public
expenditure, due to the problem of leakages in most developing countries, including
Nigeria. Once elections are not credible, the power of the electorate to hold o¢ ce
holders accountable for their performance has been completely eroded. Electoral
competition in the presence of massive rigging thus becomes mere window dressing
with little or no multiplier benets to citizens.
Chapter 3 shows that drinking of well water is harmful to the growth of children
in the country. This calls for serious concern on the part of policy makers, as
many households depend on well water as their main source of drinking water.
Piped water should be available for all and the negative future implications of
childhood stunted growth and being underweight should propel the government to
accelerate the rate of provision of safe drinking water in the country for domestic
use. Provision of safe drinking water should surpass the rate of growth of the
population, if elected leaders in developing countries really have the interests of
poor citizens at heart. In addition, it may be necessary to consider treating well
water in the country to make it safer for drinking, until piped water is available
for all, which is one of the objectives of the MDGs.
Health inequality increased under democratic rule in the country, which is an
indication of a worsening standard of living for the poor, as discussed in chapter
4. To reduce poverty in the country, democratic leaders in developing countries,
including Nigeria, should consider policies such as the provision of child allowances,
which has never been deemed necessary in many of these countries. This policy
will help the government to prevent vicious circles of poverty in the sub-region.











Investment in a¤ordable public education for the benet of the poor is necessary,
especially for women due to their crucial role in the upbringing of children and
the multiplier e¤ect of womens education on childrens health inequality in the
country.
5.0.25 Areas for future research
In the presence of weak electoral competition and ethnic politics, such as in Nigeria
and many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, politicians often depend on ethnic
loyalty rather than performance to win positions and remain in o¢ ce. The presence
of ethnic politics may have either a positive or negative e¤ect on the provision of
public goods. In the rst place, politicians may target provision of public goods
in favour of loyal ethnic groups and discriminate against rival or hostile ethnic
groups. Another scenario is for politicians to target rival or hostile ethnic groups
with the aim of winning their support in subsequent elections. The last option is
for politicians to neglect provision of public goods in both loyal and rival or hostile
ethnic groups and rely on electoral manipulation rather than ethnic loyalty. The
rst two cases will lead to increase in ethnic dimensions of inequality in access to
public goods and health while the third option will leave the inequality prior to
change in regimes unchanged. It is therefore worth exploring the ethnic dimension
of inequality in provision of public goods and health in Sub-Saharan Africa, and
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of Stunting and Being Underweight of children in
North Central for 1999 and 2008 by quintiles
MILITARY DEMOCRACY
Quintiles mean stunting standard deviation mean stunting standard deviation %
poorest 3.19 1.40 2.54 1.5 -20.4
poor 2.76 1.42 2.60 1.5 -5.8
middle 3.02 1.59 2.56 1.5 -15.2
rich 3.13 1.47 2.06 1.4 -34.2
richest 2.56 1.31 2.12 1.4 17.2
Quintiles mean underweight standard deviation mean underweight standard deviation %
poorest 1.80 1.17 1.93 1.5 7.2
poor 1.60 1.22 1.80 1.4 12.5
middle 1.56 1.17 1.65 1.3 5.8
rich 1.69 1.30 1.44 1.2 -14.8
richest 1.39 1.05 1.33 1.16 -4.3
% is the percentage quintiless change in stunting and underweight between 1999 and 2008
Table 5.2: Summary statistics of Stunting and Being Underweight of children in
North East for 1999 and 2008 by quintiles
MILITARY DEMOCRACY
Quintiles mean stunting standard deviation mean stunting standard deviation %
poorest 3.12 1.66 2.69 1.55 -13.8
poor 3.24 1.55 2.62 1.54 -19.1
middle 3.42 1.56 2.54 1.54 -25.7
rich 3.06 1.46 2.63 1.56 -14.1
richest 2.79 1.53 2.19 1.39 -21.5
Quintiles mean underweight standard deviation mean underweight standard deviation %
poorest 2.50 1.60 2.07 1.29 -17.2
poor 2.51 1.64 2.09 1.32 -16.7
middle 2.01 1.50 2.10 1.32 4.5
rich 2.27 1.48 1.89 1.14 -16.7
richest 2.04 1.52 1.69 1.17 -17.2











Table 5.3: Summary statistics of Stunting and Being Underweight of children in
North West for 1999 and 2008 by quintiles
MILITARY DEMOCRACY
Quintiles mean stunting standard deviation mean stunting standard deviation %
poorest 3.71 1.54 3.01 1.62 -18.9
poor 3.53 1.56 2.82 1.5 -20.1
middle 3.09 1.46 2.76 1.47 -10.7
rich 3.30 1.61 2.78 1.51 -15.8
richest 2.57 1.83 2.81 1.52 9.3
Quintiles mean underweight standard deviation mean underweight standard deviation %
poorest 2.55 1.80 2.49 1.48 -2.4
poor 2.19 1.31 2.40 1.5 9.6
middle 2.36 1.57 2.26 1.43 -4.2
rich 2.25 1.47 1.98 1.27 -12
richest 1.98 1.81 1.88 1.30 -5.1
% is the percentage quintiless change in stunting and underweight between 1999 and 2008
Table 5.4: Summary statistics of Stunting and Being Underweight of children in
South East for 1999 and 2008 by quintiles
MILITARY DEMOCRACY
Quintiles mean stunting standard deviation mean stunting standard deviation %
poorest 2.43 1.53 1.96 1.26 -19.3
poor 2.46 1.57 1.92 1.31 -22
middle 1.86 1.46 1.95 1.33 4.8
rich 2.37 1.28 1.91 1.40 -19.4
richest 2.32 1.47 1.61 1.36 -30.6
Quintiles mean underweight standard deviation mean underweight standard deviation %
poorest 1.39 1.13 1.60 1.18 15.1
poor 1.52 1.29 1.28 1.09 -15.8
middle 1.45 1.11 1.37 1.09 -5.5
rich 1.86 1.01 1.31 1.09 -29.6
richest 1.64 1.63 1.16 1.01 -29.3











Table 5.5: Summary statistics of Stunting and Being Underweight of children in
South South for 1999 and 2008 by quintiles
MILITARY DEMOCRACY
Quintiles mean stunting standard deviation mean stunting standard deviation %
poorest 2.48 1.29 2.27 1.45 -8.5
poor 2.71 1.30 2.08 1.46 -23.2
middle 2.57 1.41 2.09 1.36 -18.7
rich 2.33 1.31 2.13 1.35 -8.6
richest 2.95 1.68 1.88 1.40 -36.3
Quintiles mean underweight standard deviation mean underweight standard deviation %
poorest 1.60 1.37 1.65 1.19 -3.1
poor 1.82 1.37 1.47 1.18 -19.2
middle 1.46 1.01 1.28 1.05 -12.3
rich 1.69 1.31 1.41 1.04 -16.6
richest 1.65 1.47 1.17 0.98 -29.1
% is the percentage quintiless change in stunting and underweight between 1999 and 2008
Table 5.6: Summary statistics of Stunting and Being Underweight of children in
South West for 1999 and 2008 by quintiles
MILITARY DEMOCRACY
Quintiles mean stunting standard deviation mean stunting standard deviation %
poorest 3.14 1.44 2.10 1.24 -33.1
poor 3.43 1.5 2.33 1.41 -32.1
middle 2.46 1.67 1.18 1.19 -52
rich 2.30 1.47 1.95 1.30 -15.2
richest 2.10 1.40 1.92 1.33 -8.6
Quintiles mean underweight standard deviation mean underweight standard deviation %
poorest 2.21 1.73 1.44 0.97 -34.8
poor 1.65 1.08 1.58 1.15 -4.2
middle 1.93 1.43 1.47 0.97 -23.8
rich 1.50 0.94 1.32 0.02 -12
richest 1.56 1.14 1.15 0.94 -26.3
% is the percentage quintiless change in stunting and underweight between 1999 and 2008
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